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Abstract: 
 
We investigate the performance of Canadian pension funds relative to those from the UK and 
US, in the light of the ongoing quantitative asset restrictions that still apply in Canada, 
compared with the purer prudent person approach in the UK and US. We find that although 
Canadian funds often obtain better combinations of return and risk, returns are often less than 
could be obtained given financial market conditions, as shown by dummy portfolios split 
evenly between bonds and equities, or diversified into real estate, as well as mean-variance 
optimal portfolios. In contrast, UK and US funds typically outperform such benchmarks. 
Combined with criticisms of specific Canadian regulations in the light of finance theory and 
empirical evidence, the paper makes a case for removal of residual quantitative restrictions in 
Canada, and their replacement by sole prudent person regulations. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Since pension funds comprise pooled assets, which are aimed to support people‟s retirement, 
national governments have a particular concern about their investment performance and 
associated risk. Even if there is no explicit insurance of benefits, if pension funds are 
managed poorly, and unable to pay incomes to retirees in due time, governments may have no 
political choice, but to incur fiscal costs to meet up these losses (Clark and Hu 2005a). Hence, 
national governments focus closely on how to ensure pension funds are managed in an 
appropriate way. Besides solvency regulation per se, the most important investment 
regulation for pension funds is of portfolio composition. The basic choice for pension fund 
portfolio regulation is between quantitative asset restrictions (direct limits on holdings of 
specific assets) and prudent person rules (enjoining prudent investment procedures). This 
paper focuses on the situation in Canada.  
 
Although Canadian funds are today subject to a prudent person portfolio regulation, there 
remain a number of vestiges of the quantitative regulations of the past (OECD 2007a). These 
limit holdings of real estate and Canadian resource properties, limit the proportion of voting 
shares of individual companies, and restrict concentration of portfolio investment in 
securities, stocks, bonds or notes of one issuer, as well as related party investment
2
. Until 
2005, funds were subject to restrictions on international investment also (see Fried (2005), 
OECD (2005)). 
 
The aim of this study is to assess the degree to which the quantitative restrictions on Canadian 
pension plans lead to a shortfall in returns and/or higher risk compared with funds in countries 
where there are no such restrictions. We also consider wider deleterious implications of such 
regulations for pension funds, the financial sector and the economy. We study two prudent-
person countries in detail alongside Canada, namely the UK and US. The study is structured 
as follows. In the first section we assess determinants of investment for defined benefit (DB) 
funds as background for discussion of regulation. We then compare pension portfolio 
regulations in the three countries, before going on to trace the economic rationale for prudent-
person and quantitative restrictions. We survey past studies that have looked at the effects of 
quantitative restrictions on fund performance. We give an overview of work relevant to 
evaluating the regulation of Canadian funds. In this context, we oppose the view that pension 
funds are best kept as passive investors, not influencing capital markets. Against this can be 
set inter alia the growing literature on net benefits of pension fund activism in corporate 
governance. 
  
We then undertake empirical work on pension fund returns and risks in Canada, the UK and 
the US, to evaluate whether effects of quantitative restrictions in Canada can be detected 
empirically. This develops from existing work in Davis (2002a) and Hu (2007). First, we 
compare pension fund sector return data for the three countries, also with returns on synthetic 
portfolios allowing for domestic and international diversification opportunities in each 
market. The data period here is 1966-2006, but also 1990-2006 when financial market were 
less subject to structural change. We also compare national average returns with estimated 
returns on mean-variance optimal portfolios over 1978-2006. Second, using individual 
pension fund data for the three countries (for three large public sector funds in each country), 
we assess what index returns would be on their holdings and how the returns and risks differ 
across the three countries and relative to benchmarks. Third, we undertake an evaluation of 
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comparative asset growth for a wider range of large pension funds, using data for the last few 
years on around 20 of the “world‟s largest funds” in each of the three countries. 
 
2 Pension fund investment  
 
2.1 Investment considerations for defined benefit funds 
 
Essential background to any assessment of optimal portfolio regulation is how pension funds 
should invest optimally. The general trend of current occupational pension fund sector 
development is away from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) pension plans, 
although the funds we investigate are largely still DB and accordingly we focus here on issues 
related to DB. One of the key differences between these two types of pension plan is the locus 
of investment risk (Clark and Hu 2005b and Blake 2007a).  
 
For DB, pension benefits are defined, in that they are always a certain percentage of the 
employee‟s final or average salary, regardless of the fund management‟s performance. In this 
context, plan sponsors bear the investment risk. In contrast, for DC plans, the investment risk 
is transferred to the individual employees. Plan sponsors make payments to DC plan 
participants‟ accounts by matching employees‟ contributions.3 There are technically no fixed 
liabilities in DC funds, and focus can justifiably be placed on assets. 
 
For DC funds, fund managers might accordingly closely follow the simplest portfolio 
investment theory, i.e. the mean-variance approach, where the mean is the expected return 
from the various investment assets in the portfolio, e.g. bonds, equities, etc., while the 
variance is the corresponding risk. This approach holds that a DC pension fund should in 
principle maximise expected return for a given risk, so as to attain as high as possible a 
replacement ratio
4
 at retirement. In practice, in order to find the optimal asset combination 
along the optimal frontier, it is essential first to determine the risk preference of investors, 
then, based on the risk level, to find out expected returns (Blake 2003). Meanwhile, the two-
fund separation theory implies that the composition of the risky portfolio should be invariant 
to any shift in overall risk (Markowitz 1991).
5
 Risk can be varied by shifting partly into a risk 
free asset. On the other hand, when there is inflation, a risk free asset is not always available 
unless there are index linked government bonds. This makes the simple application of the 
two-fund theorem more problematic. 
 
As noted by Davis (2002a) DB plans are subject to a number of risks not present for DC 
plans, given they have fixed liabilities in a way DC plans do not: 
 Real labour earnings will affect the replacement ratio that can be financed by the 
pension fund, and given there is usually a guarantee of a certain replacement rate, the 
fund is subject to risk from this source.  
 Liabilities will also be influenced by interest rates at which future pension payments 
are discounted, and hence there are important interest rate risks.  
 Mortality risks affect the cost of the annuities provided by the fund. 
 Falling asset returns will affect asset/liability balance.  
 There are also risks of changes in government regulation (such as those of indexation, 
portability, vesting and preservation as well as changes in asset regulations) that can 
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 However, although for DC plans, any investment risk falls on individuals, it is often argued that the risk is 
ultimately borne by the government. The underlying rationale is that, if there are bad investment returns and 
either DC or DB schemes cannot deliver sufficient supplementary income to avoid pensioner poverty and 
income inequality, any shortfall might have to be met by the state. 
4
 The replacement ratio is defined as the ratio of pension income to the final salary.  
5
 When all assets are invested in the risky assets, the composition of the (total and risky) portfolio varies. 
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vastly and unexpectedly change liabilities. The example of the UK, where such 
changes have been marked, is discussed in Davis (2001). 
 
Because in DB plans, sponsors are not only responsible for making contributions to the plan, 
but are also obliged to guarantee a pre-determined retirement benefit, a strategy considering 
both assets and liabilities is more appropriate, which is also called the asset-liability 
management (ALM) approach (Blake 2007a; Blake and Inkmann 2004; Blome et al 2007). 
Broadly speaking, ALM is a risk management technique designed to match assets and 
liabilities by taking into account interest rates, cash flows etc. 
 
In principle pension plans could adopt the simplest form of ALM, called immunisation. This 
is suitable if the plan sponsor seeks to fund the accumulated benefit obligation and the 
obligation is nominal, and entails investment in fixed interest bonds
6
. Or, if the sponsor agrees 
to make price or inflation indexed pension payments at retirement, as is the case in most 
countries, long-term inflation-protected bonds should be used.
7
 However, as noted in OECD 
(2006), however, long-term bonds with price protection are not available in many countries. 
Even in those countries, like the UK and the US, where financial markets are deepest, total 
outstanding inflation-indexed government bonds were much less than aggregated pension 
fund assets. Furthermore, costs of pure bond investment can be very high; notably inflation-
indexed bonds tend to provide lower returns and therefore require higher contributions from 
plan sponsors. Two alternatives forms of ALM to immunisation, based mainly on assets and 
mainly on liabilities, can be distinguished, as follows: 
 
An asset-driven policy might argue that with an indexed accrued benefit obligation (ABO) or 
projected benefit obligation (PBO) target, an investment policy based on diversification might 
be appropriate, in the belief that risk reduction depends on a maximum diversification of the 
pension fund relative to the firm's operating investments (Ambachtsheer 1988). Moreover, 
owing to explicit or implicit indexation, fund managers and actuaries typically assume that it 
may be appropriate to include a significant proportion of real assets such as equities and 
property in the portfolio as well as bonds. By doing this, they implicitly diversify between 
investment risk and liability risk (which are largely risks of inflation), see also Daykin (1995). 
Such an approach as has historically been adopted by many DB plans, puts the main focus of 
investment on asset returns, although Ambachtsheer (2004) argues that due to poor 
governance structures, the shift to risky assets may have gone too far in many funds. 
 
More recently, liability-focused investment has come to the fore. As noted by Blake (1997), 
minimum funding levels and limits on overfunding provide tolerance limits to the variation of 
assets around the value of liabilities. If the assets are selected in such a way that their risk, 
return and duration characteristics match those of liabilities, there is a "liability immunising 
portfolio". This protects the portfolio against risks of variation in interest rates, real earnings 
growth and inflation in the pension liabilities
8
. Such a strategy, which determines the overall 
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 Immunisation is the process of constructing a portfolio that has no interest rate risk, with the present value and 
duration of the future obligation of pension funds matching those of the portfolio, mainly fixed-income assets, 
e.g. bonds. 
7
 Bodie (2001) is a strong proponent of the bonds-only investment strategy. He does not believe equities offer 
higher returns and inflation protection in the long run (which is correct if equity returns follow a random walk 
rather than mean reversion). According to this argument, unhedged equities will merely imply that such funds 
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considerations also favour bond investment by pension funds. Consistent with this argument, the UK‟s Boots 
pension funds switched all assets into bonds in 2001. 
8
 Note that this is distinct from classic immunisation, which relates to interest rate risk only. 
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asset allocation between broad classes of instrument, is an alternative form of ALM (see 
Peskin (1997), Blake (2000))
9
. There is growing interest in liability-driven investment in 
Canada (Tuer and Woodman 2005), with a focus of performance shifting from simple asset 
returns to returns relative to liabilities. This correlates with growing liabilities as the 
workforce ages.
10
 It requires considerable flexibility in asset holdings that could be hindered 
by quantitative asset restrictions. 
 
An important question for pension funds is whether they should hold international as well as 
domestic assets. Modern finance theory (Levy and Sarnat 1970; Solnik 1998) shows that as 
long as markets are not perfectly correlated, international investment in a portfolio offers 
better diversification, which implies scope for a lower risk for a given return, or a higher 
return for a given risk. Indeed, in the context of international investment, therefore, an 
appropriately constructed global portfolio
11
 should in principle be able to eliminate any 
unsystematic risk. In fact the “home bias puzzle” as discussed in Davis (2005) is that 
institutional investors hold considerably more domestic assets than would be implied by risk 
minimisation of holding the global portfolio. Regulation is one reason for imperfect 
optimisation in many countries, including Canada till 2005 where foreign asset restrictions 
held. 
 
Some have argued that for DB funds, if pension liabilities are denominated in the home 
currency, it is necessary to invest pension assets in that country‟s currency, since in this way 
pension liabilities and assets (both of which are denominated in the same home currency) 
could be closely matched (Queisser 1998). However, empirical studies find that including 
liabilities in the analysis of pension asset investment does not explain the home bias puzzle; 
for example, Yang (2003) used historic asset return data and found that even when liabilities 
are considered, US DB pension plans could still benefit from global investment. Meanwhile, 
by using UK data, Chaundy (1999) found only a marginal increase in the optimal allocation to 
domestic assets when pension liabilities are included in the mean-variance optimisation 
model.  
 
2.2 Recent investment outturns and developments for Canadian funds 
 
Tuer and Woodman (2005) conducted a study on recent trends of Canada‟s DB pension asset 
investment. Mainly relying on interviews with industry professionals, annual reports and 
publicly available data sources, they found that DB funds in Canada have shown an 
increasing interest in investing in alternative assets, e.g. property, hedge funds and 
commodities. Forces driving such changes in investment strategies include low long-term 
interest rates, pressure to beat the market and therefore earn alpha, and changes in accounting 
rules. In addition, it is argued that passive investment strategies are not able to generate 
returns sufficient to meet pension liabilities in the long run, therefore encouraging active 
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 Note that the ALM does not integrate the pension fund with the sponsor‟s balance sheet as may be warranted 
by its status as a collateral for the sponsor‟s guarantee, but treats it as an entirely separate financing vehicle. 
Davis et al (2007) show major links from sponsor‟s balance sheets to pension fund investment, consistent with 
the “integration” view. 
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 To minimise the cash flow gap between assets and liabilities over the life of DB plans, particularly those plans 
whose liabilities are linked to inflation and wage increases, major fund managers have introduced new financial 
products into the market. For example, in early 2005, SSGA (State Street Global Advisors) marketed PALMs 
(Pooled Asset Liability Matching Solution). The product involves the exploitation of the level of inflation-linked 
swap market, aiming to match pension assets and liabilities at a greater certainty. The period could range from a 
few years to 40 years, long enough to cover most pension funds‟ liabilities. These are however unlikely to be 
available in a sufficient volume to enable all funds to hedge in this manner. 
11
 A global portfolio comprises weighted holdings of each global market. Weights could be market capitalisation 
or real GDP. 
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investment; there is doubt whether a sizeable excess return on equities over bonds can be 
relied upon. However, it is noted that their data sample, i.e. selection of their interviewees was 
biased towards mid to large sized pension funds, such as the Canada Pension Plan, which 
might distort the generality of the above findings. 
 
Many DB pension plans in Canada have experienced sizeable solvency deficits over the past 
few years (Tamagno 2006). Although the extent of solvency deficits was alleviated after 
2003, i.e. following recovery of the global and Canadian equity markets, funding deficits 
remained for a protracted period and shortfall risk is a major challenge faced by DB pension 
plans, as in other countries such as the UK (Davis 2004a) and the Netherlands (Davis et al 
2007). For example, it was estimated that in Ontario, 75% of the plans overseen by the 
Financial Services Commission has a solvency deficit problem in mid-decade, and the median 
funding level was around 87% (FSCO 2006). As recently as June 2007, 50% of all the DB 
pension plans regulated by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutes under 
federal jurisdiction was in solvency deficit (OSFI 2007). Against this background, traditional 
investment strategies may again not be sufficient to tackle such financial difficulties, which 
therefore prompt needs to alternative investment strategies, seeking high return asset classes, 
although perhaps at the price of higher risk for plan sponsors and beneficiaries (OECP 2007). 
 
It will be seen below that the regulations applied to Canadian funds may hinder some of the 
strategies seen as desirable in these recent studies. 
 
3 Pension fund investment regulation  
 
Pension funds, as one form of large financial institutions, are subject to various regulations, 
although the structures of such regulations differ across countries (Srinivas et al 2000; OECD 
2007a). Our focus here is on investment regulation. One can identify two forms of 
government policies on pension fund investment; one is the strict quantitative asset 
restrictions (QAR), where the government enforces specific regulations, typically limiting the 
holding of a particular class of assets and notably international assets. The other form of 
regulation is known as the prudent person rule (PPR). One helpful definition from the OECD 
(Galer 2002) states that under the principle of the prudent person rule “a fiduciary must 
discharge his or her duties with the care, skill, prudence and diligence that a prudent person 
acting in a like capacity would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and aims”. 
Accordingly, in the context of pension fund investment, the prudent person rule requires an 
investment strategy whereby pension assets are invested prudently as someone would do in 
the conduct of his or her own affairs.  
 
The latest survey of regulations (OECD 2007a) shows Germany as an example of a country 
with QAR, whereby for Pensionskassen (a form of company pension fund structured as an 
insurance company), a maximum of 35% of pension fund assets could be invested in equities 
of listed firms and a maximum of 50% in bank deposits; as for foreign assets, the upper limit 
was 30% and there was also a 70% currency matching requirement. Most emerging market 
economies (EMEs), as well as advanced countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Spain and 
Portugal also have QAR. Among advanced countries implementing the PPR for pension fund 
investment are Australia, Canada, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and the US.  
  
Comparing Canada, the UK and US, there remain differences in the application of PPR, as 
shown in the following tables, in that the Canadians have a number of residual quantitative 
restrictions. For example, a maximum of 10% of fund book value of assets can be invested in 
the securities, stocks, bonds and notes of one company. A maximum 5% of book value can be 
invested in a single item of real estate or resource property. In contrast, the UK and US have 
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requirements to diversify or concentration limits only for certain DC funds in the US. Second, 
there are quantitative restrictions on domestic assets in Canada, which are a 25% real estate 
and resource limit (15% for resource properties), again which is not considered necessary in 
the UK and US.  
  
Each country restricts self-investment by the fund in the sponsor, with related party 
investment not permitted in Canada, limits of 10% for US DB funds, and 5% for UK funds. 
We note that the US does not restrict the self-investment for certain DC funds, which led to 
the losses in the Enron case. Ownership concentration rules apply in Canada unlike the US or 
UK, with a 30% limit on voting shares in one company (excluding special purpose 
corporations). Finally as regards foreign asset restrictions, none of these countries impose 
such restrictions on pension funds at present, although until 2005 Canadian funds were 
subject to a foreign assets maximum of 30% of the fund. 
 
Table 1: Portfolio restrictions for pension funds in Canada, UK and US as of 2006 
 
Country Prudent person 
rule/diversification rules 
Quantitative 
restrictions on 
domestic assets 
Self investment and 
ownership concentration 
Foreign 
asset 
restrictions 
Canada PPR, maximum 10% of pension 
fund assets in liabilities of one 
company, Maximum 5% of 
assets in a single item of real 
estate or single resource 
property. 
Real estate and 
resource limit to 
25%, and 15% for 
resource 
properties. 
Securities must be 
acquired on 
public exchange. 
Related party investment 
not permitted; maximum 
30% of voting shares of 
one company 
None 
United 
Kingdom 
PPR, general requirement for 
diversification and suitability. 
None Self-investment is limited 
to 5%. 
None 
United 
States 
PPR, general requirement for 
diversification except for some 
DC plans permitted to invest in 
employer securities or real 
estate. 
None Self-investment limited to 
10% for DB and most DC 
funds. Limits on their 
investment in employer 
owned stocks, bonds and 
real estate, and lending to 
employer. 
None 
Source: OECD (2007a)  
 
4 The case for pension fund portfolio regulation 
 
The ongoing presence of QAR even in an ostensibly PPR country such as Canada, as well as 
their ubiquity elsewhere (OECD 2007a) raises the issue of why governments regulate pension 
fund portfolios and what the most appropriate method is. 
 
4.1 Arguments for pension fund portfolio regulation in general 
 
Pension funds are a distinct form of asset, in that they are collected and managed with the 
purpose of providing retirement income for retirees. It can be argued, explicitly or implicitly, 
that governments always stand behind pension systems (Clark and Hu 2005a). If retirees 
cannot receive enough income to live, the government has to incur fiscal costs to meet it, 
although pensioners might not receive the same amount of income as expected from their 
funds. In consequence, to mitigate the adverse impacts of excessive risk taken by fund 
managers, governments typically seek to restrict the investment behaviour of pension funds.  
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Market failure is another reason why the authorities might seek to regulate the pension fund 
industry (Davis 2001). There are three aspects of market failure, i.e. information asymmetry, 
externality and monopoly. Information asymmetry induces well-informed parties with private 
information to selectively contract with less-informed parties, thus exploiting the latter. 
Pension fund portfolios might become excessively risky if regulations are not applied, 
although a safeguard is employee trustees. Examples include the pension mis-selling and 
Maxwell scandals in the UK. However, the response need not be investment regulation. For 
example, given the concerns about pension funds‟ performance, partly following such 
information asymmetry, it was recommended in the UK Myners Review of Institutional 
Investment (2000) to rather enhance pension fund trustees‟ competence.12  
 
Externalities arise when the behaviour of a particular group of people or firms have 
implications on others. Bank runs following the failure of a major financial institution in the 
market is one example here; nevertheless, whether such contagion could occur for pension 
funds is less clear. Nevertheless, partly in response to this risk, the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) was set up in the US, and the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund (PBGF) 
in Ontario
13
, while the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) was recently created in the UK; such a 
guarantee mechanism is conceptually similar to deposit insurance for banks (Hinz et al 1999). 
When such guarantees are available, the authorities may limit portfolio risk to prevent pension 
funds exploiting the government guarantee. 
 
A third form of market failure relates to the degree of market power. In the context of pension 
funds, it means if the market is controlled by a small number of plan sponsors, these sponsors 
might pursue the interests of the management, but at the expense of plan members. They 
might for example invest pension monies in the sponsoring company as occurred in the 
Maxwell scandal in the UK (Davis 2001) and the case of Enron in the US, justifying 
regulation on self-investment. 
  
Beyond these three main areas, governments may step in to widen market completeness, for 
example by issuance of inflation-linked bonds (e.g. in the UK) and recent policy 
recommendation on issuance of longevity bonds (Antolin and Blommestein 2007; Blake 
2007b). Davis (2002a) suggests that pension regulation has the broad core objective of aiming 
to ensure that retirement income security for individuals is ensured. This is of particular 
importance where funded pension provision is compulsory at the national or company level.  
 
Asset regulations are only a subset of the total range of regulations that apply. Table 2 shows 
that pension regulation is very wide ranging, notably on the liabilities side. Pension 
regulations include those of transferability, indexation and annuitisation. This in turn reflects 
the broader objective of pension regulation, including retirement income security rather than 
merely protecting against market failures in finance as highlighted above. The general issue 
arises of whether the wider range of pension regulations (notably on the liabilities side) makes 
portfolio controls more or less necessary. In our judgement they imply a premium on 
flexibility on the asset side. We now turn to a discussion of the different types of portfolio 
regulation. 
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 A recent survey also emphasises the growing responsibility, and thus the importance of competence and 
expertise of pension fund trustees (Clark et al 2006).   
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 See Nielson and Chan (2007) who show that funds covered by PBGF are less well funded than those not so 
covered, supporting the case that such guarantees generate moral hazard. 
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Table 2: Principal regulations of pension funds 
 
Issue Regulation Which type? Main economic issue 
Are portfolios of pension funds 
adequately diversified and 
matched to liabilities? 
Portfolio distributions Both DB and 
DC (either 
PPR or QR) 
Monopoly/ 
asymmetric information 
Are there adequate funds to pay 
pension promises? 
Funding/Solvency DB Monopoly/ asymmetric 
information 
Who should benefit from assets 
accumulated in excess of 
guaranteed pension benefit 
promises? 
Surpluses/reasonable 
expectations 
DB Fiscal/equity 
Regulation of minimum levels of 
contributions or premia 
Contributions, premia 
and commissions 
DC Monopoly/ 
Fiscal 
Should individuals and companies 
be obliged to have private pension 
schemes? 
Membership Both DB and 
DC 
Moral hazard/fiscal 
Should annuities be inflation-
indexed? 
Indexation/ 
contract design 
Both DB and 
DC 
Monopoly 
Should private pensions be an 
addition or partly a substitute for 
social security? 
Integration Both DB and 
DC 
Fiscal 
Should individuals be forced to 
take annuities, or are lump sums 
acceptable? 
Annuities Largely DC Adverse selection 
Should rights under or pension 
benefits be insured? 
Insurance Largely DB Monopoly/ 
asymmetric information 
Can losses on pension funds be 
avoided when individuals change 
job? 
Portability Largely DB Monopoly/ 
economic efficiency  
Should there be controls on the 
distribution of costs and benefits 
from pension schemes? 
Benefits, contract 
conditions 
Largely DB Monopoly/equity/efficiency 
How can one ensure adequate 
governance and member 
representation? 
Trustees, fit and proper 
controls 
Both DB and 
DC 
Asymmetric information/ 
Monopoly 
What information is essential for 
members to judge the soundness 
of pension plans? 
Information/ 
consumer protection 
Largely DC Asymmetric information 
How best to organise these 
various regulatory tasks? 
Regulatory structures Both DB and 
DC 
Economic efficiency 
Source: Davis (2002a) 
 
4.2 Arguments favouring quantitative asset restrictions (QAR) 
  
As discussed by Goodman (2000), the logic of the quantitative restriction or “prudent 
investment” approach is that prudence is equal to safety, where security of assets is measured 
instrument-by-instrument according to a fixed standard. The focus is placed on the investment 
itself. The overall risk of a pension portfolio must not go beyond a certain level, while 
allowing for the desire of pension fund sponsors to be as competitive or low-cost as possible. 
This leads to a quantitative view of prudence which is focused on the idea that the investment 
itself can be tested as to whether or not the decision was prudent at the time. The model 
effectively tests the investment category, the asset class and the outcome of the investment.  
 
Such quantitative regulation of portfolio distributions entails limits on holdings of assets with 
relatively volatile nominal returns, low liquidity or high credit risk, such as equities, venture 
capital/unquoted shares and real estate, as well as foreign assets, even if their mean return is 
relatively high. The aim is to protect beneficiaries against insolvency of operators and 
10 
 
investment risks, by ensuring adequate diversification of assets. On the other hand, explicit 
allowance is by definition not made for potentially offsetting correlations between types of 
financial instrument. It thereby overrides free choice of investments and optimal 
diversification using combinations of risky assets. Meanwhile, if they reduce insolvencies
14
, 
QAR may reduce the need for an insurance fund that might otherwise lead to moral hazard; 
and governments may, by use of asset restrictions, seek to avoid bearing the burden of bailing 
out individuals from losses following imprudent investments in products such as personal 
pensions, where the individual bears the risk. 
 
Whereas such arguments could apply both in developing countries and advanced countries 
such as Canada, others are more relevant in developing countries with emerging securities 
markets. In such countries, fund managers as well as regulators are often highly inexperienced 
and the markets volatile and open to manipulation by insiders. Investors may need to be 
prevented from taking excessive risks. This point applies more generally where regulators 
have initial doubts about internal controls in institutions, as well as about the industry‟s 
capacity for self-regulation and related governance structures. If securities markets are not yet 
developed, there may be a need for initial investment in government bonds, corporate loans 
and corporate bonds. Also compliance with portfolio limits is more readily verified and 
monitored than for prudent person rules. Further issues arise in the context of capital outflow 
controls in EMEs (Fontaine 1997).
15
 But none of these apply in advanced countries such as 
Canada.  
 
QAR investment regulations have many sub-forms. But typically they specify holding limits 
according to five dimensions, i.e. asset class, concentration of ownership, issuer, security, and 
level of risk (Srinivas et al 2000; OECD 2007a). Limits by asset class and level of risk seek to 
prevent holdings of volatile assets thought to threaten solvency as discussed above. Holding 
limits by the issuer and/or security mean that pension fund‟s investment in a particular 
issuer/share, e.g. Microsoft, cannot exceed a specified percentage of the pension fund 
portfolio, e.g. 10%. The underlying logic is that an excessive investment exposure to a single 
firm entails high risk. Based on modern portfolio theory, holding a single firm has far higher 
risk than holding the whole market. This argument was proved by numerous real-world 
examples, e.g. the collapse of Enron and Worldcom. Even the seemingly healthiest firms 
might go into bankruptcy overnight, implying the risk of investing in one firm.  
 
Limits to concentration of ownership restrict how much of a firm could be held by pension 
funds
16
. Here the issue is more linked to views of the authorities as to the appropriateness of 
pension funds exerting corporate governance influence or even taking control of firms, even 
small ones that are relatively trivial compared to the pension fund's portfolio. All five types of 
investment restrictions, i.e. by asset class, concentration of ownership, issuer, security, and 
level of risk, are similar to the prudential regulation techniques used in other financial 
                                                 
14
 In practice, there is little evidence from OECD countries that insolvencies of pension funds have been 
significantly higher with prudent person than with asset restrictions. 
15
 Exchange controls have in the past been - justifiably - imposed during foreign exchange crises to deal with 
capital flight, to avoid a sharp and costly overshooting of the currency, but often kept in looser form once normal 
conditions were re-established. On the other hand, Bodie and Merton (2002) show that it would be feasible to 
gain the diversification benefits of international investment without risk of capital flight by use of appropriate 
swap contracts. Foreign investment may be seen as risky in the absence of appropriate derivatives markets for 
risk control; and some countries also argue that restrictions are needed to boost development of domestic capital 
markets – but openness to foreign investment may also achieve this objective, while permitting international 
investment by institutional investments reduces their exposure to diversifiable risk. 
16
 Meanwhile, pension funds often have QAR on self-investment (e.g. assets are invested in the plan sponsor or 
the parties affiliated with the sponsor) (OECD 2007a). 
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institutions, e.g. banks (Hinz et al 1999). For example, the restriction by asset class is closely 
related to diversification and capital adequacy regulations for banks. 
 
4.3 Arguments favouring the prudent person rule (PPR) 
 
In contrast to QAR, Goodman (2000) notes that the prudent person rule is focused on the 
behaviour of the person concerned. Or, as noted by Galer (2002), the PPR is behaviourally 
oriented rather than outcome-focused. The process of making the investment is the key test of 
prudence. More specifically, the test in this case is of the behaviour of the asset manager, the 
institutional investor and the process of decision-making. It needs to be assessed whether, for 
example, there has been a thorough consideration of the issues, there is not blind reliance on 
experts and a form of “due diligence” investigation has been undertaken in formulating the 
strategic asset allocation. The institution would also be expected to have a coherent and 
explicit statement of investment principles.  
 
In general terms, a prudent person approach is a standard that measures a course of conduct 
and not an investment outcome. The prudent person rule, in effect, allows the free market to 
operate throughout the investment process while ensuing, along with solvency regulations and 
appropriate decisions regarding contributions in the light of market conditions, that there is 
both adequacy of assets and appropriate levels of risk. Rather than the focus being on the 
external rules, the onus is rather on internal controls and governance structures in which the 
authorities may have confidence. The authorities correspondingly require information on 
these aspects rather than purely focusing on the composition of the asset portfolio, as is 
feasible with quantitative restrictions. Hence, a wider degree of transparency is needed for the 
institutions (including in particular identification of lines of responsibility for decisions and of 
detailed practices of asset management). Such monitoring may be delegated to self-regulatory 
bodies, which have incentives to maintain compliance in order to protect the reputation of the 
industry and if there are forms of mutual insurance against losses. 
 
In this context, one major principle of the PPR is diversification, i.e. pension funds should be 
suitably diversified in order to avoid the unwarranted concentration of investment in 
particular asset classes. There is an implicit or explicit presumption that diversification of 
investments is a key indicator of prudence. Vittas (1998) highlights that under PPR pension 
funds could invest in private equity, for example. Indeed, as noted above, pension fund 
managers also in Canada have started to expand the traditional asset classes (e.g. bonds and 
equities) and explore new investment opportunities (e.g. real estate, foreign assets and hedge 
funds), which is mainly for the reason of maximising diversification benefits as well as 
aiming to achieve higher returns so as to meet rising pension liabilities. QAR would limit this. 
 
 
4.4 Weighing up the arguments 
 
On balance, economic arguments strongly support PPR. The general case against quantitative 
portfolio regulations is put succinctly by European Commission (1999), namely that they are 
“in the way of optimisation of the asset allocation and security selection process, and 
therefore may have led to sub-optimal return and risk taking”. In more detail, drawing on the 
discussion above and Davis (2002a), they: 
 
 prevent appropriate account being taken of the duration of the liabilities (which may 
differ sharply between sponsors and between funds, as well as over time), and related 
changes in risk aversion; 
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 render difficult or impossible the application of appropriate immunisation or ALM 
techniques for maturity matching, because such techniques may require sharp 
variations in the portfolio between equities to bonds, and use of derivatives; 
 in terms of risk and return optimisation, they are likely to enforce holdings of a 
portfolio below the efficient frontier, because they typically insist on high proportions 
of bonds and domestic assets; 
 they focus unduly on the risk and liquidity of individual assets and fail to take into 
account the fact that, at the level of the portfolio the default risk and price volatility 
can be reduced by diversification, while liquidity risk depends on the overall liquidity 
position of the investor and not the individual instruments; 
 if portfolio regulations limit use of derivatives, abstracting from other operative limits, 
they will force the institution either to hold low-yielding assets or expose itself to 
unnecessary risks; 
 they are inflexible and cannot be changed rapidly in response to changing conjunctural 
economic circumstances and movements in securities, currency and real estate 
markets; they also may find it difficult to adapt to structural changes in financial 
markets; 
 if enforced strictly, they may give incentives to asset managers to hold proportions of 
risky assets which fall well short of the limits, to avoid breaching them when markets 
perform well and prices rise; 
 they may encourage low levels of surplus assets, given the low returns on equity that 
they entail; 
 they encourage strategies to be conducted so as to conform with legal restrictions 
rather than attaining good returns, reducing risk and other desirable objectives. 
Notably they may limit tactical asset allocation; 
 they encourage national governments to treat pension funds as means to finance 
budgetary requirements, in a way that could not occur under a prudent person rule 
(this occurred disastrously in the case of the Argentine financial crisis, when the 
government forced funds to hold rapidly devaluing government bonds); 
 they typically reduce the extent to which the diversification benefits of international 
investment may be attained, and can even be said to expose policy holders to currency 
risk, given that they will want to spend some of their income on foreign goods and 
services, and the domestic currency may depreciate; 
 conversely, whereas regulations on domestic assets may seem appropriate in a small 
domestic market where there is high volatility and undiversifiable risk in equities, so 
as to ensure adequate diversification and portfolio liquidity, the widening and 
deepening of capital markets may make the regulations less necessary; 
 limits on exposures to single borrowers are unnecessary for the most part, since 
diversification mandated by prudence would require small stakes in any case. 
 
There may also be deleterious effects of portfolio regulations on the asset management 
industry and the economy as a whole: 
 
 there might be less incentive for the institutional investor to nominate investment 
managers with skills to achieve higher return and lower risk; 
 competition among asset managers is discouraged if their main function is to meet 
quantitative asset restrictions; 
 the development of the industry per se is likely to be set back, especially if entry by 
foreign managers is restricted
17
; 
                                                 
17
 The traditional lack of competitiveness of the Japanese asset management sector, low resultant asset returns, 
the consequences for the funding of pension funds, and the benefits of deregulation of entry and portfolio 
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 quantitative restrictions may lead to inefficient allocation of capital and hence hold 
back economic growth and employment; 
 in particular, limits on unquoted shares and venture capital (including limits on the 
proportion of a firm‟s equity that can be held) can hinder the dynamic small firm 
sector, which generate the bulk of new employment; 
 they increase costs for employers providing pensions, hindering job creation. 
 
The case should not be overstated, however; as noted, even in OECD countries, limits on self-
investment are appropriate to prevent concentration of risk. Meanwhile a difficulty with 
prudent person rules lies in the fact that court judgements (or desire to avoid litigation) may 
lead to narrow interpretations of risk and safety, see Del Guercio (1996)
18
. Of course, 
avoidance of individually high-risk assets that could improve the overall risk and return 
profile of the portfolio may actually be contrary to beneficiary protection, which was the 
intention of prudent person rules. Such interpretations may also encourage a focus on 
portfolio indexation. Indexing to narrow core market indices (such as the FTSE-100 and S 
and P 500) artificially drives up the value of the firms that are included and may increase the 
volatility of the investors‟ assets. 
 
Portfolio limits would appear to be particularly inappropriate for DB funds, given the "buffer" 
of the sponsor guarantee for the beneficiaries and risk sharing between older and younger 
workers, and if benefits must be indexed. Clearly, in such cases, portfolio regulations may 
affect the cost to sponsors of providing pensions, if it constrains managers in their choice of 
risk and return, forcing them to hold low yielding assets, and possibly increasing their risks 
and costs by limiting their possibilities of diversification. Even solvency rules may not be 
essential if there is an appropriate actuarial and accounting framework
19
. 
 
5 Empirical research on pension fund portfolio regulations 
 
Extant empirical work supports the beneficial role played by the PPR when compared to the 
QAR. For example, the European Federation for Retirement Provision conducted a study 
investigating whether the PPR is advantageous over the QAR. By using data for the period of 
1984-1993, this study shows that pension funds from those European countries adopting the 
PPR achieved an average real rate of return of 9.5%, while this figure for those countries 
adopting the QAR was 6.9% (Queisser 1998). A similar finding was obtained by an OECD 
study (Galer 2002). 
 
More recent research in this area was conducted by Davis (2002a). He investigated the 
benefits of international diversification in the context of pension fund investment. With a 
dataset covering 7 developed countries from 1980-1995, it was found that the hypothetical 
real return for pension funds in these countries on average was 7.8% with PPR, while it was 
5.8% with QAR.  
  
Research on EMEs is quite scanty; one exception is Davis (2005) who extended his earlier 
database and analysis to three EMEs (i.e. Chile, Singapore and Malaysia), in which a 
hypothetical shift to the PPR would impact positively on the pension fund returns for the 
latter two countries, but not for Chile. Meanwhile, Hu et al (2007) recently conducted a study 
with focus on the quantitative beneficial impact of pension fund investment liberalisation on 
                                                                                                                                                        
regulations, are considered in Davis and Steil (2001). This situation developed under long standing QAR, that 
was only recently abolished. 
18
 She found that bank managers subject to PPR in running trust accounts hold 31% of their equities in stocks of 
companies rated A+ by Standard and Poor‟s while the corresponding figure for bank run mutual funds is 15%. 
19
 See the discussion of the pre-1995 regime in the UK in Davis (2001). 
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China‟s funded pension savings, including both mandatory individual accounts and voluntary 
occupational pensions. It was found that returns on the basic portfolio (which captures the 
actual restrictive pension portfolios in China) were consistently lower, and much lower in 
some cases, than those on the more diversified portfolios.
20
   
  
Meanwhile, Hu (2007) looked at pension asset allocation in 39 countries, 17 emerging 
markets and 22 advanced countries. He found a beneficial impact of the regulatory move from 
the QAR to PPR, as highlighted by the positive values of the rate of change in the Sharpe 
ratios comparing mean variance optimal portfolios with foreign assets to those confined to 
domestic assets. This finding applies to pension funds in both OECD countries and EMEs, 
with a larger effect on the latter. Second, due to the different asset return characteristics, 
optimal pension fund portfolio compositions found varied markedly across countries. If 
higher risk aversion coefficients are specified, there is more investment in the risky portfolios, 
which is consistent with financial theory. These results were new to the literature (compare 
Reisen 1997; Davis 2002a, 2005), in incorporating risk aversion (at the national level) into the 
optimal analysis and also investigating a wide range of countries
21
.  
 
Hu (2007) also found a higher proportion of pension funds optimally allocated to foreign 
assets in EMEs than those in OECD countries. This might be mainly due to the lesser 
correlation between domestic markets in EMEs with foreign markets and the high volatility of 
EME domestic markets. The result is particularly important in the light of the prevalence of 
QAR regulations in EMEs. Furthermore, his statistics suggested the importance of property 
investment in pension fund portfolio optimisation, and the results were applicable to both 
OECD countries and EMEs. Such empirical findings support the arguments of Booth (2002), 
where property was frequently estimated to be included in the optimal portfolio regardless of 
maturity of the pension funds. Hu‟s overall results were in favour of the prudent person rule 
(PPR) investment approach and against the quantitative asset constraint (QAR) approach 
notably in terms of foreign investment. Therefore, his recommendation was liberalisation of 
pension fund global investment. Also, his findings highlighted the potential large benefit 
arising from international investment for pension funds in EMEs. 
 
Another study was recently conducted by OECD (2007b), which looks at the extent to which 
different regulatory regimes impact on the performance of privately managed pension funds. 
By comparing actually observed returns with a set of different benchmark returns, it was 
found, albeit tentatively, that in all the sampled countries, including both selected developed 
and developing countries, pension funds underperform when compared to the hypothetical 
optimal portfolio, and investment restrictions have a damaging effect on performance. For 
example, actual returns achieved by pension funds in the US and UK underperformed than 
that of hypothetical optimal returns by 1.8% and 1.1%, respectively. It was found, however, 
that the Canadian pension funds outperformed the optimal portfolio by 2.2%, the results of 
which need to be viewed with caution, since its observation period is from 1990 to 2005, 
which therefore might not be able to capture the long-term nature of pension fund investments.  
  
In addition, Davis (2002a) highlights that there are other influences on pension fund portfolios 
besides asset restrictions, which need, however, to be taken into account before conclusions 
are drawn from studies such as the above on the effects of the regulation. They are also 
relevant to the work presented in this paper. These include: 
 
                                                 
20
 The finding was robust even if two different observation periods (one in 1993-2006, the other is 1993 to 2004) 
were used, given the concern that high volatility of returns on stocks during 2005-06 might distort the empirical 
results. 
21
 In Dutta et al (1999) 5 OECD countries were investigated. 
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 solvency and minimum funding rules and their interaction with associated accounting 
arrangements may play a crucial role in influencing portfolios of defined benefit 
funds, and may account for the non binding nature of the portfolio restrictions 
themselves. This is because they determine the size and volatility of the surplus, as 
well as defining the rules for dealing with a corresponding deficit. They hence 
influence the likelihood and cost
22
 of any deficiency, and hence the importance for 
pension funds of maintaining a stable valuation of assets relative to liabilities, 
independent of portfolio limits. 
 minimum rates of return set annually by regulation in some countries can constrain 
diversification even when quantitative limits are not stringent (OECD 2007a). This is 
because they limit holdings of volatile assets which could reduce returns below the 
limit in one year, even if they offer a high return in the long run; 
 application of accounting principles which insist on positive net worth of the fund at 
all times, carry equities on the balance sheet at the lower of book value and market 
value
23
 and calculate returns net of unrealised capital gains may restrain equity 
holdings independently of portfolio regulations. 
 liabilities have a major influence, for example on the share of bonds, in that (i) 
inflation sensitivity of liabilities will determine the demand for assets acting as 
inflation hedges such as index linked bonds, as well as assets whose return is 
unaffected by inflation such as real estate and equities; (ii) the need for cash flow will 
play an important role by determining the need for liquidity to meet (known or 
uncertain) cash flows, for example in the context of growing maturity of pension 
funds, and policy loans/early surrender for life insurers; (iii) duration of liabilities in 
combination with the strictness of minimum funding and solvency rules will set a 
benchmark for the duration of assets - or if they are not matched, to the scope of 
interest rate risk. Besides differing between countries, these factors will differ strongly 
between individual institutions; 
 higher taxation on bonds than equities makes the former an attractive investment to 
tax-exempt investors such as pension funds; 
 ownership and control of pension funds may influence portfolios, via the degree of 
risk aversion of those controlling the fund and the degree to which those holding 
residual risks can control asset distributions; 
 concerning international diversification, in small countries the assets of institutional 
investors may exceed the entire domestic equity market, and hence simple liquidity 
considerations necessitate international investment, abstracting from risk/return 
considerations, if regulations permit; 
 the structure of pension fund asset management markets and related levels of 
competition is likely to impact on the efficiency of investment, whereby protection of 
fund managers from external competition may lead to a sub optimal investment 
strategy from the point of view of beneficiaries; 
 whereas in principle capital market activity should ensure that asset returns are 
equalised across countries, owing to international investment restrictions, exchange 
controls etc., this has not always been the case in the past, resulting in markedly 
different real returns on assets; 
 financial structure more generally may have an important role to play. In traditionally 
bank-dominated economies where capital markets play a subordinate role, it is loans 
that often dominate the portfolios of long-term institutional investors. 
                                                 
22
 As an example, in the UK, the accounting rule FRS17 enforces mark to market, on balance sheet accounting 
for pension liabilities with no smoothing and use of a corporate bond yield discount rate. It is considered to be 
leading to widespread abandonment of defined benefit funds altogether (Davis 2001, 2004a). 
23 These regulations were abolished in Germany after the impact on life insurers‟ solvency of asset price falls 
following the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11th 2001 became apparent. 
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6 The debate on QAR in Canada 
 
In Canada there is a specific debate underlying the particular regulations that were highlighted 
in Section 3 above, which had been introduced in the Pension Benefits Standards Act of 1985. 
As noted by Fried (2005), the rules, like those recently abolished on foreign assets (FPRs), 
were based on the belief that government rules are necessary for the proper allocation of 
resources. He notes that experience has shown that the foreign asset restrictions were in fact a 
barrier to prudent management of pension plans, and basically were a tax on middle income 
earners. His estimates suggested a cost of between C$1.5 and 3 billion per annum, even when 
set at 30%; these comprise administrative costs, costs of reduced asset-manager competition 
and the limits imposed on diversification (Burgess and Fried 2004).  
 
Fried expressed the view that the ongoing rules on property, company holdings etc as 
described in Section 3 also make “little if any sense especially given what has been learned in 
from the costly exercise with the Foreign Property Rule” and asserts that efficient markets and 
sponsors‟ fiduciary obligations are the best basis for fund investment. It is clear that the FPRs 
administrative costs, costs of reduced competition and the limits imposed on diversification 
may apply equally to these ongoing restrictions. Experience since the abolition of FPRs, with 
the national average pension fund holding of foreign assets rising to 31% of total assets in 
2006, and OMERS and CPP rising to 32% (as shown in Table 3), suggests that the FPRs even 
at 30% up to 2005 had been a binding constraint. The vastly better performance of Canadian 
funds in the 1990-2006 period over 1966-89 (Table 5) in terms of both return and risk is 
suggestive of the benefits of FPR abolition, since progressive abolition took place in the later 
period. 
 
Looking at specific current rules, the limits on real estate and resource properties as a 
proportion of the portfolio assume that real estate assets are more risky than other forms of 
asset; such rules hinder diversification and are redundant in the context of PPR. Furthermore, 
the use of book value as a measure of the portfolio exposure is inappropriate since market 
values are the relevant ones. Eichholz (1996) shows that cross border real estate investment 
offers considerable diversification benefit since national markets are not strongly correlated 
with one another, although Case, Goetzemann and Rouwenhorst (1999) highlight relatively 
high correlations in the recent period, and this is corroborated by Davis and Zhu (2004). A 
number of studies such as Hu (2007) and Booth (2002) have shown that (domestic) real estate 
is a highly appropriate asset for pension fund investment, and our results in Table 7 for mean-
variance optimisation support this also, given its returns are rather uncorrelated with 
securities. This suggests the limits on real estate are potentially very costly, even though as 
shown in Table 3, Canadian funds‟ current holdings are well below the limit. 
 
The so-called 30% rule, limiting the holdings of voting shares by companies, is based on the 
idea that pension funds should be passive investors, not influencing capital markets. OMERS 
(2007b) argues that this rule impedes ability to protect beneficiaries interests when investing 
in illiquid assets, may dissuade investors from investing in venture capital, limits use of risk 
management, and puts Canadian pension funds at a disadvantage in investing vis a vis hedge 
funds and pension funds from other PPR countries such as the UK and US. 
  
The 30% rule is likely to limit pension fund investment in small firms, which is often seen as 
a weakness even in prudent person countries, but which will be aggravated in Canada. Sias 
(1996), for example, shows that for the United States total institutional holding of the largest 
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firms on average over 1977-91 was over 47% and for the smallest, only 8%.
24
 The 
consequence of neglect of small firms by pension funds (assuming individual investors do not 
fill the gap) may be biases in the economy towards sectors with larger firms (for even if small 
firms can obtain bank loan finance, growth potential via debt is likely to be more restricted 
than with equity in addition). This may be contrary to the comparative advantage of the 
economy as a whole, not least given small firms' potential for innovation, growth and job 
creation is widely seen as crucial for economic growth.  
  
Further economic background to the voting shares debate is that on pension funds and 
corporate governance, which suggests acting passively is not the best way to maximise 
returns, especially for a large fund. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that pension funds acting 
for future pensioners have scope to become important representatives of minority 
shareholder‟s interests, possibly electing independent board members as well as being able to 
access regulators and influence public opinion. As they are large investors, they may 
coordinate with other institutions so as to remove the free-rider problem which is normally a 
difficulty preventing action by minority shareholders. In this context, the "corporate 
governance movement" among pension funds in the US since 1990 reflects dissatisfaction 
among pension funds with costs of the take-over mechanism, and preference for direct 
influence as equity holders on incumbent management (Davis 1995, 2002b). It also links to 
indexation by large funds, which seek to improve the performance of firms they have to hold, 
as well as more generally the situation where pension fund holdings are so large that they 
cannot readily sell their participations without significant market movements against them. 
 
There is a growing literature on the impact of corporate governance initiatives on company 
performance, albeit mainly focusing on the effects on share prices per se, which would benefit 
the pension funds involved. For example, Wahal (1996), in a sample of forty-three cases, 
found that efforts by institutional investors to promote organizational change via negotiation 
with management (as opposed to proxy proposals) are associated with gains in share prices. 
Strickland et al. (1996) report that firms that were targeted for pressure by the United 
Shareholders Association
25
 experienced positive abnormal stock returns, although corporate 
governance proposals per se had no effect. Gillan and Starks (2000) show that shareholder 
activism by U.S. public pension funds has been successful in the 1990s, as measured by 
voting outcomes and stock market reaction. Smith (1996) reports favourably on the effects of 
CALPERS governance initiatives. Faccio and Lasfer (2000) show that the monitoring role of 
UK pension funds is concentrated among mature and low-performing firms and that in the 
long run, the firms in which pension funds have large stakes markedly improve their stock 
returns.  
 
In a most recent study of Sweden, Giannetti and Laeven (2007) show that firm performance 
improves if large private funds or public funds take larger stakes in it. They show actual 
evidence of activism in that public pension funds are most likely to be represented on board 
nominating committees, and this has an independent positive effect on performance. Only 
large funds that are not linked to financial institutions or industrial groups have a positive 
effect on performance, though. Not all results are positive for corporate governance activism. 
Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) found no evidence that activism had a significant effect on 
US stock returns over the three years following the proposals. Woitdke (2002) argues pension 
funds do not improve performance because of objectives that conflict with value 
maximisation. 
                                                 
24
 Note however, that besides limits on voting shares, such reticence may link to illiquidity or lack of 
marketability of shares, levels of risk which may be difficult to diversify away, difficulty and costs of 
researching firms without track records. 
25
 Note that this is actually a coalition of small investors rather than a pension fund per se. 
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All of these studies are based on micro evidence. Davis (2002b) undertook macro work based 
on the share of equities held by pension funds and life insurers. The results are 
complementary to micro work if the view is taken that the effects of takeovers, institutional 
activism etc are not just apparent in the performance of targeted firms but also in the wider 
economy. This may be the case if managers of “unaffected” firms nonetheless change their 
behaviour in response to the threat of such action. Results were found which are consistent 
with a disciplining role of institutions in the Anglo Saxon countries, particularly life insurers 
and pension funds. The signs on their share of equity in the total are consistent with the view 
that they exert restraint of fixed investment (that can be wasteful if there is inadequate 
shareholder monitoring), and lead to a boost to dividends and to Total Factor Productivity. 
Furthermore, higher institutional holding is favourable to R and D (Davis 2004b). 
 
Summarising, this section has shown that there are specific arguments against the form QAR 
has taken in Canada – notably that they limit holdings of the highly attractive asset real estate 
thus limiting optimisation, and that they limit corporate governance initiatives and holding of 
small firms that could hit the economy as well as the pension fund sector. As for FPR all of 
these ongoing restrictions entail heightened administrative costs, costs of reduced competition 
and limit diversification. These strengthen the general case against QAR put forward in 
Section 4 and the empirical work showing their deleterious effects summarised in Section 5. 
 
7 Empirical work 
 
As discussed above, there are two approaches to pension fund regulation, i.e. QAR and PPR. 
The evidence above suggests that the latter is more desirable than the former, notably in 
Advanced countries. In this section, we seek to analyse empirically whether this hypothesis is 
valid and if so, to what extent Canadian funds with more QAR elements are disadvantaged 
compared to the pension funds subject to “pure” PPR as in the UK and the US. 
 
7.1 Data 
 
We have constructed data on annual real returns on eight different classes of assets over 40 
years from 1966-2006; those returns are short-term asset (ST) yields (money market interest 
rates), domestic corporate bond (CB) yields, domestic government bond (GB) yields, 
domestic equity returns (EQ), mortgage (MO) yields, domestic property (PR) yields, foreign 
asset (FA) returns, and yields on other residual asset classes (OA), see Appendix 1 for average 
real returns and risk. Inflation is deducted from nominal returns to obtain real returns. Bond, 
equity and property returns are all total returns, including both annual income and capital gain 
or loss. Foreign asset returns are also adjusted for exchange rate changes, and comprise 
market-capitalisation weighted returns on all of the major non-domestic markets, 50% bonds 
and 50% equities. “Other residual asset” yields are simply set equal to the average return on 
identified assets. Similar datasets were used in Davis (2005), Davis and Steil (2001) and Hu 
(2007), but all are with shorter time periods, i.e. 1967-1995, and 1967-2004. 
  
All return data were collected from existing sources, i.e. Davis and Steil (2001), Datastream, 
Global Financial Data, IMF database, national central banks, the WDI (World Development 
Indicators) 2007, as well as Hu (2007). The pension fund sector portfolio distribution data at 
the national level for Canada are from Statistics Canada, that for the UK from the Office for 
National Statistics, UK, while that for the US from the Federal Reserve Board. The portfolio 
distribution data of the largest pension funds in the three sample countries was collected from 
the AP Information Services and the individual homepages, except for OMERS, in which 
case it was provided by OMERS directly. See Appendix 2 for details.  
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7.2 Simple real return comparison with benchmarks 
 
In order to assess the effects of portfolio regulations, we first estimated the returns on pension 
funds‟ portfolios, using aggregate data for the respective sectors. This was done by weighting 
the various components of the asset portfolio by the annual total holding period returns 
obtained on the corresponding instruments in the market. The implicit assumption is that the 
institutions are holding the index portfolio in each instrument. Hence, no account is taken of 
possible benefits of active management in raising returns, while equally transactions and 
administrative costs, which would otherwise act to reduce returns, are also disregarded. 
Clearly, this involves a marked degree of estimation and conclusions should be drawn 
cautiously, but we maintain that it does highlight the impact of restrictions on assets better 
than other measures such as actual returns, which also incorporates effects of the quality of 
management. In effect, we are focusing on asset allocation‟s optimality (choice of 
instruments) and abstracting from that of security selection (choice of securities). No account 
is taken of the liability mix including pension fund maturity. Moreover, we note that the 
degree to which the (nominal or real) return and the standard deviation alone can be used to 
assess the optimality of portfolio choices is limited, given that the liabilities may justify some 
alternative approaches to investment (such as immunisation or shortfall risk minimisation) not 
focused on risk and return alone, see Borio et al (1997). 
 
Direct cross country comparisons of absolute real returns and risks are problematic in that the 
returns that can be obtained in national markets often vary sharply
26
. Hence, it is also relevant 
to compare realised returns with various achievable benchmarks in national capital markets, 
These are: 
 
 a 50-50 portfolio of domestic bonds and equities; 
 a global portfolio of 50-50 international bonds and equities, distributed across the 
other markets with GDP weights; 
 20% and 40% international investment variants, again based on 50-50; 
 a more diversified portfolio which is broadly in line with current practice, as shown in 
Table 3 below. This comprises 35% domestic equities, 10% domestic property, 25% 
domestic bonds and 30% foreign assets, split evenly between bonds and equities. This 
benchmark is useful in showing what historic returns could have been if current 
relatively liberalised portfolios were always held (notably, that the foreign asset 
restrictions that held till 1985 in Canada were not applicable, nor the limits on foreign 
assets in the UK before exchange controls were abolished in 1979). 
 
7.3 Using the mean-variance approach and two-fund separation theorem 
 
An alternative benchmark for portfolio optimisation is derived from the Markowitz (1959) 
and Sharpe (1990) two-fund separation theory. This seeks to calculate an optimal risky 
portfolio based on mean and variance of return. Then, all investors are hypothesised to make 
their investment choice between two funds, i.e. a risk-free asset or fund and a risky portfolio 
comprising risky assets (e.g. equities and bonds); in addition, this theorem argues that 
regardless of risk preferences, all investors will choose precisely the same risky portfolio, and 
difference in risk preferences among investors will determine the actual mix of the risk-free 
asset
27
 and the risky portfolio in the investors‟ complete portfolios. Technical aspects of the 
calculation are shown in Appendix 3. 
                                                 
26
 Reasons include varying development of the capital market, interest rates, economic growth and exchange rate 
developments, and more generally imperfect capital market integration. 
27
 However, strictly speaking, there is no risk-free asset notably when there is inflation. 
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Industry practice for pension funds as well as academic research shows it is indeed common 
to apply the mean-variance approach to find an optimal portfolio, or as a benchmark. The 
mean-variance approach can apply to both DC and DB plans. For both cases, some objective 
functions should be maximised, while the difference is that compared to the DC plan, pension 
liabilities are a more serious issue for the DB plan. For example, by incorporating liabilities 
into the analysis of optimal asset allocation, Yang (2003) seeks to quantify the gains from 
international diversification, and Blake and Inkmann (2004) identify the linkage between 
discount rates and asset allocation. Both studies are conducted under the mean-variance 
framework, which involves a maximisation of objective functions in the surplus of assets over 
liabilities in DB plans. In our work reported below, we use a simple optimisation model 
which is directly applicable to simple DC plans; partly owing to lack of information, our 
analysis does not allow for liabilities, unlike, e.g. Sharpe and Tin (1990), and Blake and 
Inkmann (2004).  
 
7.4 Empirical results 1
28
: average pension funds in Canada, UK and US 
 
We now go on to compare pension funds‟ national-average calculated returns with 
benchmarks using the asset return data described above and national sector-balance-sheet 
data. The balance sheet and asset return data cover 1966-2006. Table 3 below shows the 
evolution of national-average portfolios over this period. Long-term trends for Canadian 
funds have been a reduction in bonds and mortgages and a marked build-up in foreign assets. 
For UK funds, there has been similar trends, as well as a long-term decline in domestic 
equities and real estate. As regards US funds, there is a shift out of bonds, as well as a rise in 
foreign assets
29
.  
 
                                                 
28
 Please note that in addition to this approach using national pension fund sector data, we also followed the 
same methodology using the largest three pension funds in Canada, UK and US. The results are given in 
Appendix 4. 
29
 However, it is noted that due to lack of information on foreign investment by US pension funds at the national 
level, we estimated foreign asset allocation by the average of CALPERS, NY City and NY State funds for 1990-
2006. Before 1990, the only information is in Ehrlich (1981) that US funds held 2% of assets abroad in 1980. 
We used this to give estimates from 1966-89 of gradual growth in international investment by US funds. 
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Table 3: Portfolios of pension fund sectors (value weighted average pension funds), in % 
  Short term Bonds Equities Mortgages Property 
Foreign 
assets 
Other 
assets 
Canada 1970 5 53 22 11 1 0 8 
 1980 9 51 26 11 2 4 2 
 1990 10 47 25 5 3 6 8 
 2000 3 32 29 2 5 28 1 
 2006 5 30 26 2 4 31 3 
UK 1970 4 33 50 0 11 2 0 
 1980 5 24 45 0 18 8 0 
 1990 8 11 46 0 9 18 7 
 2000 5 14 39 0 5 22 16 
 2006 3 19 26 0 8 31 13 
US private 1970 7 26 54 3 Na 1 9 
 1980 13 24 45 1 Na 2 15 
 1990 11 24 38 1 1 3 22 
 2000 6 10 54 0 1 18 12 
 2006 4 9 59 0 1 19 9 
US public 1970 1 72 17 10 Na 1 0 
 1980 2 68 22 6 Na 2 0 
 1990 6 50 39 2 1 3 1 
 2000 5 24 52 1 1 18 0 
 2006 3 18 60 1 1 19 0 
Sources: National Flow of Funds data (see Byrne and Davis 2003). Note: (1) All rows might not sum to 100 (%), 
duet to rounding; (2) Bonds equal to sum of corporate bonds and government bonds; (3) all asset classes (except 
Foreign assets) refer to domestic assets; (4) US fund foreign assets: see Footnote 28;  (5) US private: US private 
pension funds; (6) US public: US state and local government employee retirement funds.  
 
Table 4 shows the basic results for the sectors, which thus represent average pension fund 
portfolios (value weighted). It can be seen that Canadian funds on the face of it have varying 
combinations of real return and risk between sample periods. Their overall return over 1966-
2006 was below the UK and the US state and local pension funds. Risks, however, are lowest 
in Canada; therefore, the trade-off shown by the Sharpe ratio
30
 between return and risk is 
favourable to Canadian funds over this 40-year period.  
 
Table 4: Comparing pension fund sector real returns and risks, in % (except Ratio) 
 
  Canada United Kingdom 
United States – 
private funds 
United States – state 
and local funds 
66-06 Mean 5.4 7.7 5.6 5.7 
 S. Dev 8.0 15.0 10.6 10.6 
 Ratio 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 
66-89 Mean 3.4 8.3 4.4 4.4 
 S. Dev 8.1 18.0 10.9 10.9 
 Ratio 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 
90-06 Mean 8.3 7.0 7.2 7.7 
 S. Dev 7.1 9.8 10.3 10.2 
 Ratio 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Source: authors‟ own calculations. S. Dev: standard deviation; (Sharpe) Ratio: mean/standard deviation.   
 
One problem is that financial market conditions have changed considerably over this period, 
so we also split the period into the 1966-1989 and 1990-2006 periods. In the earlier period, 
the UK had a highest return and Canada had the lowest risk. In terms of the return and risk 
trade off ratio, UK still performed better than both Canada and US, which in turn witnessed 
the same Sharpe ratio. In the later period, Canadian funds are estimated to have the highest 
return and the lowest risk, and thus the highest Sharpe ratio. 
                                                 
30
 The Sharpe ratio is defined as (nominal return – riskless return) / risk (i.e. standard deviation). In our study, 
since we used real returns, it could be assumed that riskless return in real terms is zero; therefore the above 
formula is reduced to real return/risk.  
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Table 5: Sector real returns and benchmarks, in % (except Ratio) 
Canada 
Actual 
portfolio 
50-50 
domestic 
20% 
foreign 
40% 
foreign 
Global 
portfolio 
Diversified 
portfolio 
66-06 Mean 5.4 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.2 6.0 
 S. Dev 8.0 9.9 9.4 9.3 11.6 8.6 
 Ratio 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 
66-89 Mean 3.4 3.2 3.8 4.4 6.2 4.6 
 S. Dev 8.1 9.8 9.6 9.9 13.0 8.9 
 Ratio 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 
90-06 Mean 8.3 9.2 8.6 8.0 6.2 8.1 
 S. Dev 7.1 9.3 8.6 8.3 9.6 8.1 
 Ratio 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.0 
United Kingdom       
66-06 Mean 7.7 7.2 6.8 6.4 5.2 6.9 
 S. Dev 15.0 16.3 14.5 13.3 13.6 13.5 
 Ratio 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 
66-89 Mean 8.3 7.4 7.0 6.6 5.5 7.2 
 S. Dev 18.0 20.1 17.6 15.7 15.0 16.0 
 Ratio 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
90-06 Mean 7.0 7.0 6.6 6.1 4.8 6.5 
 S. Dev 9.8 9.1 9.1 9.4 11.8 9.4 
 Ratio 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.7 
United States – private 
funds     
  
66-06 Mean 5.6 5.4 5.7 6.1 7.1 6.1 
 S. Dev 10.6 11.8 10.8 10.7 15.4 10.0 
 Ratio 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 
66-89 Mean 4.4 3.8 4.8 5.8 8.8 5.7 
 S. Dev 10.9 12.9 12.0 12.1 17.4 11.1 
 Ratio 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
90-06 Mean 7.2 7.6 7.0 6.4 4.7 6.8 
 S. Dev 10.3 10.1 9.0 8.7 12.0 8.6 
 Ratio 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.8 
US state and local funds       
66-06 Mean 5.7 5.4 5.7 6.1 7.1 6.1 
 S. Dev 10.6 11.8 10.8 10.7 15.4 10.0 
 Ratio 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 
66-89 Mean 4.4 3.8 4.8 5.8 8.8 5.7 
 S. Dev 10.9 12.9 12.0 12.1 17.4 11.1 
 Ratio 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
90-06 Mean 7.7 7.6 7.0 6.4 4.7 6.8 
 S. Dev 10.2 10.1 9.0 8.7 12.0 8.6 
 Ratio 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.8 
Source: authors‟ calculations. S. Dev: standard deviation; (Sharpe) Ratio: mean/standard deviation.  Actual 
portfolio is that of pension fund sector, multiplied by returns by asset class. 50-50 domestic means 50% allocated 
to domestic equities and 50% to domestic bonds. 20% (40%) foreign means 20% (40%) allocated to global 
portfolio. Global portfolio is split evenly between foreign bonds and foreign equities with adjustment for foreign 
exchange rate changes. Diversified portfolio consists of 35% in equities, 25% in bonds, 30% in foreign assets 
and 10% in property.  
 
The more telling comparison is with national benchmarks that take account of the differing 
asset returns and risks across countries. Table 5 shows the levels of the sector returns and 
benchmarks, and Table 6 the difference between them. The benchmarks are, as noted, a 50-50 
domestic equity-domestic bond portfolio, a similar portfolio with 20% foreign, a 40% foreign 
portfolio and a global portfolio where domestic holdings are limited to global portfolio 
weights (which are particularly low for Canada and the UK), and finally a diversified 
portfolio where 35% in equities, 25% in bonds, 30% in foreign assets and 10% in property, 
comparable to 2006 portfolios in Table 3. Underperformance is shaded in grey. For Canada it 
is apparent that the returns often fall short of those that are feasible. For example, in 1966-
2006 the actual pension fund sector return is below any portfolio including foreign assets as 
well as the diversified portfolio, perhaps reflecting the foreign asset restrictions prevalent till 
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2005. This is also frequently true in 1966-89 and in 1990-2006. A redeeming feature is that 
risks on the fund sector portfolio tend to be lower, and hence the Sharpe ratio is generally 
higher. In contrast to Canada, in the UK the pension fund sector tends to outperform the 
benchmarks in terms of return, although the risks tend to be lower on the benchmarks. For US 
private funds, both the 1966-06 and 1966-89 periods tended to see underperformance relative 
to benchmarks, except the domestic 50-50 portfolio, while in the later 1990-2006 period, 
funds outperformed benchmarks other than the domestic 50-50 portfolio. Risks, however, are 
frequently lower than for the dummy portfolios; therefore Sharpe ratios vary between 
portfolios. For US state and local funds, the story is similar to the private funds except for 
1990-06 where the fund returns outperform the benchmarks.  
 
Table 6: Comparing sector real returns with benchmarks, in % (except Ratio) 
 
 
Actual 
portfolio 
less 
50-50 
domestic 
20% 
foreign 
40% 
foreign 
Global 
portfolio 
Diversified 
portfolio 
Canada      
66-06 Mean -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.8 -0.6 
 S. Dev -2.0 -1.5 -1.4 -3.6 -0.7 
 Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
66-89 Mean 0.2 -0.4 -1.0 -2.8 -1.1 
 S. Dev -1.7 -1.5 -1.8 -4.9 -0.8 
 Ratio 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
90-06 Mean -0.9 -0.3 0.3 2.0 0.1 
 S. Dev -2.2 -1.6 -1.2 -2.6 -1.0 
 Ratio 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.2 
United Kingdom      
66-06 Mean 0.5 0.9 1.3 2.5 0.8 
 S. Dev -1.3 0.4 1.7 1.4 1.4 
 Ratio 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
66-89 Mean 0.9 1.3 1.6 2.7 1.1 
 S. Dev -2.1 0.4 2.3 3.0 2.0 
 Ratio 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
90-06 Mean -0.1 0.4 0.8 2.2 0.5 
 S. Dev 0.7 0.7 0.3 -2.1 0.3 
 Ratio -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 
United States – private 
funds    
  
66-06 Mean 0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -1.5 -0.6 
 S. Dev -1.2 -0.2 -0.1 -4.8 0.6 
 Ratio 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 
66-89 Mean 0.6 -0.4 -1.4 -4.4 -1.3 
 S. Dev -2.0 -1.1 -1.2 -6.5 -0.2 
 Ratio 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
90-06 Mean -0.4 0.2 0.8 2.6 0.5 
 S. Dev 0.2 1.3 1.6 -1.8 1.7 
 Ratio -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.1 
US state and local funds      
66-06 Mean 0.4 0.0 -0.3 -1.3 -0.4 
 S. Dev -1.2 -0.2 -0.1 -4.8 0.6 
 Ratio 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 
66-89 Mean 0.5 -0.4 -1.4 -4.4 -1.3 
 S. Dev -2.0 -1.1 -1.3 -6.5 -0.2 
 Ratio 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
90-06 Mean 0.1 0.7 1.3 3.0 0.9 
 S. Dev 0.1 1.2 1.5 -1.9 1.6 
 Ratio 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Key: see Table 5. Source: authors‟ calculations.  
 
Consistent with the above findings, data in Table 6 also show that actual returns on the 
Canadian pension funds underperform than the benchmark returns, as indicated by the 
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frequent negative values of the differentials (these are shaded to aid recognition). In contrast, 
UK pension funds outperform the benchmark in all cases except for the domestic bond-equity 
portfolio in 1990-2006. In the US case, private funds underperform internationally-diversified 
portfolios in the earlier period and domestic portfolio in the later one. In contrast, US state 
and local funds outperform all benchmarks over 1990-2006. 
 
These results are consistent with the beneficial effects of an unrestricted portfolio composition 
under the prudent person rule in the UK and US, compared with the hybrid regulations in 
Canada. 
 
In addition to the simple comparison with a set of benchmark returns, we also computed the 
optimal portfolios based on the mean-variance approach and the two-fund separation theorem. 
Results for 1978-2006 are given in Table 7.
31
 Before going to details, it is necessary to 
explain some definitions. “Overall return/risk” means return/risk of the overall portfolio (i.e. 
risk free asset plus the risky portfolio), while “risky fraction” refers to the share of the risky 
portfolio relative to the overall portfolio. Our main panel has the five principal assets, equities, 
corporate bonds, government bonds, real estate and foreign assets.
32
 We show three 
alternative approaches to investment, one with 100% risky assets, one with 5%, 10% and 20% 
in cash and another with lower risk consistent with a risk aversion coefficient of 0.5 and 
around 40% in the risky asset. The right hand columns in italics show the actual returns on 
pension funds over this period and the excess return is the difference actual less optimal. 
 
The optimal portfolio distribution is worthy of note, as it has high shares of property for all 
three countries, suggesting that it is sub-optimal to restrict property holdings as is the case in 
Canada. The good performance of property in a mean variance portfolio is consistent with the 
work of Booth (2002) cited above. We suggest that it relates to the relatively idiosyncratic 
behaviour of property returns, as compared with more globally integrated and hence more 
closely correlated markets for bonds and equities. 
 
Then, the key result is that Canadian pension funds underperform the optimal risky portfolio 
(panel 1) in terms of real returns, by 30 basis points per annum, while UK and US funds 
outperform by 60 and 30 basis points, respectively. The implication is that Canadian funds are 
investing sub-optimally, below the frontier of efficient portfolios, as they could obtain more 
return and less risk by investing in the optimal risky portfolio. This underperformance is even 
greater for the medium risk portfolios of panel 2 (i.e. excess return is always relatively greater 
for US and UK funds at each risk level) and low risk portfolio of panel 3 (i.e. only 3.1% 
excess return for Canadian funds as against 5.1% for the UK and 3.9% for the US ones).  
 
                                                 
31
 The optimisation package was unable to give consistent results for the 1990-2006 period, while results for the 
1966-2006 period were not realistic.  
32
 Meanwhile, two alternative optimal portfolios were calculated, i.e. one with the full set of assets, while the 
other one that excludes mortgages given this asset class‟s over-concentration in the former case. Results for the 
1966-2006 period were also generated. These are available from the authors on request. 
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Table 7: Mean-variance optimisation results for hypothetical pension funds 1978-2006 
 
(1) High risk mean variance portfolio (100% risky portfolio) 
 
Overall 
Return 
Overall 
Risk 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Risky 
Portfolio     
Fund 
Return 
Fund 
Risk 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Excess 
return 
on fund 
    CB GB EQ PR FA     
Canada 7.9  5.7  1.385  0.231  0.034  0.112  0.460  0.163  7.6 7.8 1.0 -0.3 
UK 7.9  6.7  1.178  0.070  0.189  0.303  0.437  0.000  8.5 8.9 0.9 0.6 
US 7.2  6.0  1.215  0.000  0.030  0.271  0.658  0.042  7.5 9.9 0.8 0.3 
 
(2) Medium risk mean variance portfolios (80-95% risky portfolio) 
 
Overall 
Return 
Overall 
Risk 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Risky 
Return 
Risky 
Risk 
Risk 
Fraction 
Risky 
Portfolio     
Fund 
Return 
Fund 
Risk 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Excess 
return 
on 
fund 
       CB GB EQ PR FA     
Canada 7.2 4.7 1.5 7.3  4.9  0.95  0.111  0.164  0.087  0.510  0.129  7.6 7.8 1.0 0.4 
 7.0 4.5 1.6 7.3  4.9  0.9 0.111  0.164  0.087  0.510  0.129  7.6 7.8 1.0 0.6 
 6.6 4.0 1.7 7.3  4.9  0.8 0.111  0.164  0.087  0.510  0.129  7.6 7.8 1.0 1.0 
UK 6.9 5.5 1.3 7.1 5.7 0.95  0.018  0.378  0.183  0.421  0.000  8.5 8.9 0.9 1.6 
 6.8 5.3 1.3 7.1 5.7 0.9 0.018  0.378  0.183  0.421  0.000  8.5 8.9 0.9 1.7 
 6.4 4.8 1.3 7.1 5.7 0.8 0.018  0.378  0.183  0.421  0.000  8.5 8.9 0.9 2.1 
US 6.1 4.6 1.3 6.3 4.7 0.95  0.198  0.000  0.122  0.667  0.013  7.5 9.9 0.8 1.4 
 5.9 4.4 1.3 6.3 4.7 0.9 0.198  0.000  0.122  0.667  0.013  7.5 9.9 0.8 1.6 
 5.5 4.0 1.4 6.3 4.7 0.8 0.198  0.000  0.122  0.667  0.013  7.5 9.9 0.8 2.0 
 
(3) Low risk mean variance portfolio (risk aversion coefficient of 0.5) 
 
Overall 
Return 
Overall 
Risk 
Sharpe 
Ratio1 
Risky 
Return 
Risky 
Risk 
Risk 
Fraction 
Risky 
Portfolio     
Fund 
Return 
Fund 
Risk 
Sharpe 
Ratio2 
Excess 
return 
on 
fund 
       CB GB EQ PR FA     
Canada 4.5  1.8  2.507  7.3  4.9  0.37  0.111  0.164  0.087  0.510  0.129  7.6 7.8 1.0 3.1 
UK 3.4  2.0  1.701  7.1 5.7 0.35  0.018  0.378  0.183  0.421  0.000  8.5 8.9 0.9 5.1 
US 3.6  2.1  1.714  6.3 4.7 0.44  0.198  0.000  0.122  0.667  0.013  7.5 9.9 0.8 3.9 
Notes: (1) Risk aversion coef; risk aversion coefficient. (2) Overall return (risk): overall return (risk) of the 
whole portfolio which consists of risk-free asset and risky portfolio according to the two-fund separation 
theorem. (3) Sharpe ratio 1(2): Return divided by risk. (4) Risky return (risk): return (risk) of the risky portfolio. 
(5) Risk fraction: share of risky portfolio relative to the whole portfolio. (6) Fund return (risk): return (risk) of 
the actual pension funds. (7) Excess return on fund equals actual returns minus optimal. (8) The composition of 
the risky portfolio (and Risky return/risk) varies when the risk fraction is 1; the composition of the risky 
portfolio (and Risky return/risk) does not vary when the risk fraction is less than 1.  
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7.5 Empirical results 2: other large pension funds in Canada, UK and US 
 
We collected data on around 20 funds for each of our 3 countries over the period 2000-2006, 
see Appendix 4, for the most part from fund websites. These data complement the more 
detailed and longer-term analysis of the 3x3 funds over 1990-2006 shown above. Note that 
for many funds returns have to be derived from the percent increase in asset values, which is 
distorted by contributions (although generally these are small relative to total asset values). 
These annual asset values are in fact the sole data available for most funds. 
 
 
Table 8: Characteristics of top-20 individual fund real returns, 2000-2006 
 2000-
2006 
2000-
2006 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Canada average SD        
Mean fund return 5.2 7.9 5.0 -4.3 -7.2 9.2 10.7 11.5 11.7 
Benchmark (40% foreign) 6.4 7.6 8.4 -10.0 4.6 12.0 10.1 9.9 9.6 
Excess over benchmark -1.2  -3.4 5.8 -11.9 -2.9 0.5 1.6 2.1 
Standard deviation across funds 4.0  4.5 3.4 3.6 7.7 3.4 2.6 2.6 
          
UK          
Mean fund return 1.7 9.9 -2.1 -11.6 -9.8 2.1 12.0 11.0 10.2 
Benchmark (40% foreign) 2.4 7.5 -9.2 -6.0 0.2 9.1 6.8 8.1 8.1 
Excess over benchmark -0.7  7.1 -5.6 -10.0 -7.0 5.2 2.9 2.1 
Standard deviation across funds 11.1  11.3 7.9 9.4 16.3 17.3 9.1 6.8 
          
US          
Mean fund return 0.7 7.9 1.1 -10.8 -9.8 5.7 8.8 3.9 6.3 
Benchmark (40% foreign) 2.1 8.0 -10.0 -6.2 0.6 12.5 6.8 2.9 8.3 
Excess over benchmark -1.4  11.2 -4.6 -10.4 -6.8 2.0 0.9 -2.0 
Standard deviation across funds 4.9  8.7 2.3 3.0 8.7 4.7 3.7 3.4 
Data source: Fund websites; in general Canadian data are actual returns while the returns for the UK and US are 
derived from changes in asset values. Benchmark is real return on 40% foreign portfolio allocated 50-50 between 
foreign bonds and foreign equities (the remaining 60% domestic portfolio is assumed to be allocated 50-50 
between domestic bonds and domestic equities).  
 
The period chosen was marked by the equity bear market, that led to negative returns for 
many funds in each of the three countries, as shown in Table 8. However, as shown by the 
benchmark, conditions were more benign in Canada than elsewhere, with a mean benchmark 
return of 6.4% compared to 2.4% in the UK and 2.1% in the US. As before, the most 
appropriate comparison is of funds‟ performance with feasible returns; in view of the 
development of portfolios highlighted above, we choose a 40% foreign portfolio as a 
benchmark. Here we see the UK funds markedly outperform the Canadians, with an 
underperformance of –0.7% compared to –1.2% in Canada and –1.4% in the US (these 
comparisons are approximate since we do not have portfolio data for this wider range of 
funds). This could be attributed to asset restrictions in Canada, while US are poorer in terms 
of asset allocation, possibly due to “home asset preference”.33 
 
                                                 
33
 Note however that this result is sensitive to the choice of benchmark, with the Canadian funds doing relatively 
better against the “diversified portfolio” including property shown in Tables 5 and 9. 
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Meanwhile, Canadian funds‟ return was of similar volatility to US funds (standard deviation 
of 7.9% in each case compared with 9.9% in the UK). An interesting figure is the average of 
the yearly standard deviations of fund returns. This shows how dispersed as opposed to “herd-
like” are funds in their investment behaviour. We see that the Canadian funds are the most 
comparable (average dispersion of 4% compared with 4.9% in the US and 11.1% for the UK). 
It can be argued that this is a sign of adopting common portfolios, which may partly reflect 
the similar liabilities and risk preferences associated with the Canadian and US pension 
schemes (i.e. largely DB mature pension funds), and also may be a consequence of the 
portfolio regulations highlighted in the paper. 
 
Note in looking at these data that in terms of the ratio of returns the Canadian funds‟ 
performance is more impressive (i.e. the ratio of the mean return to the benchmark). We note 
also that the results could relate to the types of funds, where in both the US and Canadian 
sample there are a number of unsophisticated funds with potential governance problems, 
whereas the UK funds are all likely to be well run and with leading-edge investment 
approaches. 
 
Summarising Section 7, we have found shortfalls in Canadian funds‟ performance relative to 
benchmarks at a number of levels; national data over 1966-2006, 1966-89 and 1990-2006 and 
with optimal portfolios over 1978-2006; for 3 large funds from each country over1990-2006; 
and for the top-20 funds over 2000-2006. Returns, in other words, are generally (albeit not 
universally) lower relative to the benchmark than those corresponding funds in the UK and (at 
times) the US. In each case, it is likely that quantitative asset restrictions contributed to 
underperformance by biasing the asset allocation away from the most appropriate one for the 
fund‟s liabilities (bearing in mind that the data are generally for DB or mainly-DB funds). 
Funds in Canada are not - or have not been - exploiting opportunities as widely as are their 
counterparts. This will have consequences for the cost of providing a given level of pensions. 
On the other hand, as noted in Section 5, it is acknowledged that there are other influences on 
pension fund portfolios besides such asset restrictions, so conclusions need to be drawn with 
caution. 
 
 
8 Conclusions  
In this paper, we reviewed the arguments relating to investment regulations of pension funds 
and then investigated the performance of Canadian pension funds relative to those from the 
UK and US, in the light of the ongoing quantitative asset restrictions that still apply in that 
country, compared to the “pure” prudent person approach in the UK and US. A summary of 
our findings is shown in Table 9. Overall, we found that although Canadian funds often obtain 
better returns and risks, these are often less than could be obtained given financial market 
conditions. In contrast, UK and US funds often outperform benchmarks. Although the 
differences we identify may seem small, they cumulate strongly over time. Over a 40-year 
period, scope for 0.5% higher investment returns gives rise to a 22.1% larger portfolio, and a 
1% improvement raises the final pensionable sum by 48.9%. Combined with criticisms of 
specific Canadian regulations in the light of finance theory and empirical evidence, we 
contend that the paper makes a case for removal of outstanding quantitative restrictions in 
Canada, and their replacement by sole prudent person regulations. Notably, we found that the 
real estate limit in Canada, although not a binding constraint on individual funds, is 
inconsistent with the optimal portfolio generated by the mean variance calculation. This 
means Canadian funds are limited in the scope to minimise risk subject to return by the 
regulations. Although our results for the other regulations are less clear cut, this result plus the 
overall poorer performance than UK and US funds is evidence for their having a negative 
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effect on performance also. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the results are imperfect and 
not all favour the hypothesis, so further research is needed. 
 
Table 9: Summary of findings 
 
Section Finding 
2: Pension fund 
investment 
Many Canadian DB funds found themselves in deficit in 2007, which may require 
alternative investment strategies, seeking high return asset classes. Equally, the shift to 
liability driven investment requires flexibility in asset holdings. Both of these may be 
hindered by portfolio regulations. 
3: Pension fund 
investment 
regulation 
Canadian funds, although ostensibly subject to prudent person rules, are also constrained 
by a number of quantitative asset restrictions not present in the UK and US. 
4: The case for 
pension fund 
portfolio 
regulation 
Notably in advanced countries, it is hard to find economic arguments that favour 
quantitative asset restrictions over a prudent person approach. They are likely to lead to sub 
optimal return and risk taking, thus harming fund beneficiaries, as well as having adverse 
effects on the asset management industry and the economy as a whole. 
5: Empirical 
research on 
pension fund 
portfolio 
regulations 
Extant transnational studies show that prudent person rules play a beneficial role compared 
with quantitative asset restrictions. In both advanced and emerging market countries, 
quantitative asset restrictions lead to a marked underperformance of pension funds relative 
to feasible and/or optimal portfolio benchmarks. On the other hand, it is acknowledged that 
there are other influences on pension fund portfolios besides such asset restrictions, so 
conclusions need to be drawn with caution. 
6: The debate on 
QAR in Canada 
There are specific arguments against the form QAR has taken in Canada – notably that they 
limit holdings of the highly attractive asset real estate thus limiting optimisation, and that 
they limit corporate governance initiatives and holding of small firms that could benefit the 
economy as well as the pension fund sector. As for FPR all of these ongoing restrictions 
entail heightened administrative costs, costs of reduced competition and limit 
diversification. 
7.4: Empirical 
results for 
average pension 
funds over 1966-
2006 
Canadian pension funds on average have achieved lower returns than were feasible, both 
over 1966-89 and 1966-2006. This is less the case for US funds, and not at all the case for 
UK funds, which have almost always outperformed their benchmarks. This 
underperformance can be attributed to portfolio regulations. Canadian funds also 
underperform optimal portfolios based on mean-variance optimisation, whereas UK and 
US funds outperform them. It is notable that such optimal portfolios recommend levels of 
property investment that are ruled out by current Canadian investment regulations. 
7.5: Empirical 
results for other 
large pension 
funds over 2000-
6 
Large Canadian funds on average show a greater shortfall relative to a chosen benchmark 
over 2000-2006 than UK or US funds. They also show greater correlation of performance, 
that may reflect “herding” of asset managers. Both of these may be attributed to the 
influence of portfolio regulations. 
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Appendix 1: Statistical summary of asset returns in Canada, the UK and the US 
 
   ST CB GB EQ MO PR FA OA 
Canada 66-06 Mean, % 2.9 6.5 4.6 6.8 5.2 6.5 6.2 5.5 
  S. Dev, % 2.4 13.0 10.1 15.1 2.0 6.3 11.6 5.5 
  Ratio 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 2.6 1.0 0.5 1.0 
 66-89 Mean, % 3.0 1.1 2.5 3.9 5.1 6.9 6.2 4.1 
  S. Dev, % 2.6 12.0 11.2 14.3 2.1 4.8 13.0 5.8 
  Ratio 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 2.4 1.4 0.5 0.7 
 90-06 Mean, % 2.8 14.2 7.5 10.8 5.5 6.0 6.2 7.6 
  S. Dev, % 2.2 10.5 7.7 15.8 1.8 8.0 9.6 4.6 
  Ratio 1.2 1.4 1.0 0.7 3.0 0.7 0.6 1.6 
UK 66-06 Mean, % 1.4 3.5 3.4 11.1 4.0 6.0 5.2 4.9 
  S. Dev, % 4.9 12.8 8.3 28.4 4.2 11.0 13.6 8.0 
  Ratio 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.6 
 66-89 Mean, % 0.1 0.6 1.9 12.8 3.2 5.5 5.5 4.2 
  S. Dev, % 6.1 13.4 9.8 34.9 5.2 12.0 15.0 9.3 
  Ratio 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 
 90-06 Mean, % 3.3 7.5 5.4 8.7 5.0 6.7 4.8 5.9 
  S. Dev, % 1.4 11.1 5.3 16.1 2.0 9.8 11.8 5.7 
  Ratio 2.3 0.7 1.0 0.5 2.4 0.7 0.4 1.0 
US 66-06 Mean, % 1.4 4.4 3.5 7.3 4.4 5.9 7.1 4.9 
  S. Dev, % 2.1 9.3 11.6 16.8 2.6 5.1 15.4 5.9 
  Ratio 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.4 1.7 1.2 0.5 0.8 
 66-89 Mean, % 1.5 3.9 2.4 5.3 4.3 6.1 8.8 4.6 
  S. Dev, % 2.5 11.3 13.2 16.9 3.3 2.3 17.4 6.9 
  Ratio 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.3 2.6 0.5 0.7 
 90-06 Mean, % 1.3 5.1 5.1 10.1 4.5 5.7 4.7 5.2 
  S. Dev, % 1.5 5.8 9.0 16.8 0.9 7.5 12.0 4.4 
  Ratio 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.6 4.8 0.8 0.4 1.2 
Source: various sources, see Section 7.1 and Appendix 2 for details. ST: short-term assets; CB: domestic 
corporate bonds: GB: domestic government bonds; EQ: domestic equities; MO: mortgages; PR: property; FA: 
foreign assets; OA: other residual asset classes. All real returns are nominal returns less inflation. Note that bond, 
equity and property returns are based on total returns (capital gain plus income yield); foreign asset returns are 
based on non-domestic global portfolios split evenly between equities and bonds and adjusted for exchange rate 
changes, the other asset category is the simple average of the other returns. 
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Appendix 2: List of data sources 
 
(1) Domestic 
asset returns ST CB GB EQ MO PR FA OA 
Canada BOC 
BOC, 
DS, DAS DS, GFD DS, GFD BOC DAS, IPD Panel 2 Authors 
UK 
BOE, 
DAS 
WW, 
DS, DAS DS, GFD DS, GFD BOE, DAS DAS, IPD Panel 2 Authors 
US 
GFD, 
FRB DS, GFD DS, GFD DS, GFD EFD, FRB 
DAS, 
NCREIF Panel 2 Authors 
                  
(2) Foreign 
asset returns 
Foreign 
bond 
Foreign 
equity 
(3) Portfolio distribution  
at the national level 
(4) Portfolio distribution of 
the individual funds     
Domestic 
return 
DS, 
GFD DS, GFD Canada 
Statistics 
Canada All countries 
AP 
Information 
Services, 
individual 
homepages 
and OMERS     
Weights BIS DS UK 
Office for 
National 
Statistics         
Exchange rate WDI WDI US 
Federal 
Reserve 
Board         
Keys for asset classes: see Appendix 1. BIS: Bank of International Settlement; BOC: Bank of Canada; BOE: 
Bank of England; DS Datastream; DAS: Davis and Steil (2001); GFD: Global Financial Data; FRB: US Federal 
Reserve Board; IPD: International Property Data; WDI: World Development Indicator; NCREIF, National 
Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries. 
 
Appendix 3: Calculation of the mean-variance optimal portfolio 
 
Markowitz (1959) shows that the efficient set of feasible mean-variance opportunities can be 
found by either maximising portfolio returns for a given risk, or minimising portfolio risks for 
a given return. As a development of Markowitz‟s mean-variance model, the two-fund 
separation theorem has been widely accepted in the portfolio management studies with 
introduction of risk-free asset and particularly investors‟ risk aversion. The classic two-fund 
separation theorem states that all investors will make their investment choice between two 
funds, i.e. a risk-free asset or fund and a risky portfolio comprising risky assets (e.g. equities 
and bonds) (Sharpe 1990); in addition, this theorem argues that regardless of risk preferences, 
all investors will choose precisely the same risky portfolio, and difference in risk preferences 
among investors will determine the actual mix of the risk-free asset
34
 and the risky portfolio 
in the investors‟ complete portfolios. In the context of the two-fund separation framework, the 
mean-variance approach needs to be followed to find the optimal weights in the portfolio. 
Basically there are two steps. The first is to find the tangency portfolio (i.e. the tangency point 
between the efficient frontier and the capital allocation line CAL, see below), while taking 
into account investors‟ risk preferences the second step involves moving the above-mentioned 
tangency portfolio along the CAL so as to find the optimal risk-adjusted portfolio (i.e. 
maximised utility), see Figure 1.  
 
Specifically, the efficient set of feasible mean-variance opportunities should be first found by 
solving two standard optimisation problems, i.e. maximise portfolio returns for a given risk, 
or minimise portfolio risks for a given return as follows: 
 
Minimize VWWT2W subject to: fWf RRR W1R
T)(                                             (1) 
                                                 
34
 However, strictly speaking, there is no risk-free asset notably when there is inflation. 
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where: 
 
 
NW
W

1
W (weights of risky assets in the risky portfolio) 
 
 
NNN
N



1
111
V (variance of risky assets) 
 
 
NR
R

1
R (return of risky assets in the risky portfolio) 
 
T: matrix transposition;  
1 : identity matrix;  
2
W : variance of the risky portfolio; 
WR : return of the risk portfolio; 
fR ; return of the risk-free asset. 
 
Equation 1 can be solved with the Lagrangian function as follows: 
 
L= ))((
2
1
W1RVWW
TT
ffW RRR                                                                         (2) 
 
To find the solution of the Markowitz problem, Equation 2 should be differentiated with 
respect to W and and the subsequent first derivatives are set to zero. As a result, the 
following 1
st
 order conditions are found: 
 
0)( 1RVW
W
fR
L
                                                                                                 (3) 
0)( W1R TffW RRR
L
                                                                                       (4) 
 
Furthermore, the optimal weights for both risky portfolio and risk-free asset (corresponding to 
the tangency portfolio) can be obtained via the two equations below:  
 
)( 1RVW 1 fR                                                                                                               (5) 
W1
T1fW                                                                                                                         (6) 
 
Solutions to the above two equations will produce the weights we expect for an efficient 
frontier, which however is just the first step of the two-fund separation theorem. The second 
step of the theorem says that investors can adjust their individual optimal portfolio along the 
capital allocation line (CAL) according to their degree of risk aversion. In this context, the 
rational investors maximise their utility. Mathematically,  
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Maximize:  
RA
y
RREyR
RA
REU
W
fWf
C
C
22
)
2
])([
)(
                                                                                        (7) 
where: 
 
)( cRE : expected return of the complete portfolio 
)( WRE : expected return of the risky portfolio 
2
C : variance of the complete portfolio 
2
W : variance of the risky portfolio 
y: proportion in the risky portfolio 
RA: coefficient of risk aversion 
 
Here, RA represents the investor‟s marginal rate of substation of variance for expected value. 
In this context, utility can be interpreted as dependent on a risk-adjusted return, as it is 
calculated by deducting a risky penalty factor (i.e. RAC /
2 ) from the expected return )( cRE .  
 
Figure 1: Optimal complete portfolio and risk aversion  
 
Source: Hu (2007) 
 
Graphically, as depicted in Figure 1, in order to find optimum portfolios, two steps (in line 
with the equations above) are involved. First, it is necessary to find the optimal risky portfolio 
A, which is also the tangency portfolio of the efficient frontier and the capital allocation line 
(CAL). As noted earlier, this optimal portfolio A is the same for all investors. Second, given 
difference in risk preferences among investors and ability to borrow and lend risk-free assets, 
investors could move their complete portfolios along the CAL to find their individual optimal 
complete portfolios (risk-free asset plus risky portfolio). For example, as shown in Figure 1, a 
more risk averse investor will lend his/her fund at the market rate and move his/her optimum 
portfolio combination to the point B, which is also the tangency portfolio of the CAL and the 
Optimal risky portfolio A 
Capital allocation 
line (CAL) 
Optimal complete portfolio B 
(more risk averse investor) 
Optimal complete portfolio 
C (less risk averse investor) 
Risk 
R
etu
rn
 
Rf Efficient frontier 
36 
 
indifference curve of this investor. In contrast, if the investor is less risk averse, he/she might 
borrow money at the market rate
35
 and use the funds to invest in the risky portfolio, which 
corresponds to the optimal complete portfolio C (i.e. the point to the right of the optimal risky 
portfolio A). Based on the 2-fund separation theorem, the more risk averse investors are, the 
more funds are invested in the risk-free asset, and the less funds are invested in the risky 
portfolio. Meanwhile, the proportion of the individual asset class (bond, equity, etc) in the 
risky portfolio is the same regardless of how funds are allocated between the risk-free asset 
and risky portfolio.  
 
Above we described the procedure for finding the optimal complete portfolios, under 
Markowitz‟s mean-variance approach as well as the two-fund separation theorem. Underlying 
this framework is the fact that portfolio risk is lower, if more assets are included in a 
portfolio, as long as they are not perfectly correlated with each other. This reasoning, 
addressing the old wisdom to “Never put all eggs in one basket”, is particularly useful for 
portfolio management, since it lays out an appropriate theoretical foundation for portfolio 
investment, see also Section 2.  
 
In view of the fact that markets across countries are not correlated, or move in one direction, 
Levy and Sarnat (1970) and Solnik (1998), among others, extend Markowitz‟s mean-variance 
framework into global investment. They believe that substantial advantages in risk reduction 
could be achieved by investing in foreign assets, as depicted in Figure 2. In this context, the 
total risk of a portfolio will depend not only on the number of securities, but also most 
importantly the riskiness of each security, and the extent to which these individual securities 
are correlated with each other. In other words, a portfolio selection strategy of choosing 10 
shares from one country is almost certain to be less desirable than another strategy of 
choosing one share from 10 different countries. 
 
Figure 2: Efficient frontiers with seven countries 
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35
 Note, however, that pension funds do not typically borrow, so the optimal complete portfolios are most likely 
to be between Rf and A in Figure 1. 
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Appendix 4. More analysis on the three large pension funds in Canada, the UK and US 
 
In this section, by following the same methodology as in Section 7.4, we compare to what 
extent the performance of selected large pension funds in each country differs relative to a set 
of benchmark returns. The funds with the observation period from 1990-2006 are: 
 
 For the UK, Bank of England (BoE), Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS), 
Strathclyde and British Telecommunications (BT) 
 For the US, CALPERS, New York City Employees (NY City) and New York State 
Employees (NY State) 
 For Canada, Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (OMERS), Ontario 
Teachers‟ Pension Plan (OTPP), and Canada Pension Plan (CPP). 
 
Note that we are calculating index returns rather than the funds‟ actual returns, which may 
vary from the former due to investment skills in obtaining “alpha” and are in any case not 
available for the US and UK. In effect, as for sectors shown above, the outturns show funds‟ 
efficacy in asset allocation but not security selection. The funds‟ portfolios are shown in 
Table 4A. It is evident that there has been a degree of cross country convergence between 
1990 and 2006 in foreign asset holdings, although other trends are more idiosyncratic, with 
Canadian funds decumulating bonds and building up mortgages and real estate and other asset 
holdings, UK funds building up bonds and reducing domestic equities and real estate; US 
funds have been relatively stable apart from the growth of foreign assets and reduction in real 
estate and mortgages. 
 
Table 4A: Portfolios of major pension funds, 1990 and 2006 (percent of total) 
 
  
Short term 
assets Bonds Equities 
Mortgages and  
Real estate Foreign assets Other assets 
Canadian funds       
OMERS 1990 4 18 41 23 9 4 
 2006 1 14 23 20 32 11 
CPP 1990 0 99 0 0 0 1 
 2006 11  31 21  5 32 0 
OTPP 1990 0 93 3 0 4 0 
 2006 0 20 16 14 31 20 
UK Funds       
BT 1990 4 13 50 21 12 0 
 2006 0 24 28 12 30 6 
BoE 1990 4 2 60 4 30 0 
 2006 3 36 31 5 24 0 
Strathclyde 1990 7 7 53 11 22 0 
 2006 0 12 40 10 33 11 
USS 1990 6 5 48 15 14 11 
 2006 2 4 37 7 50 0 
US Funds       
CALPERS 1990 5 22 36 28 9 0 
 2006 1 22 40 7 24 6 
NY State 1990 3 40 47 8 0 2 
 2006 6 22 42 4 16 10 
NY City 1990 11 37 31 20 0 0 
 2006 1 39 42 0 16 2 
Sources: AP data and pension fund websites 
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Results of return calculations are given in Table 4B. For the three selected Canadian pension 
funds, in terms of the return on the actual portfolio OMERS performs better than CPP, but 
comparably with OTPP. For example, the average real return over 1990 and 2006 was 9.1% 
for OMERS and 9.2% for OTPP, while it was 8.9% for CPP. However, if risk is taken into 
account, the three funds almost performed the same, as indicated by the value of the Sharpe 
ratio ranging from 1.1 to 1.3. Note that CPP was severely restricted in its investments till 
2001 and the CPP Investment Board did not begin investing until 1999, which helps account 
for poorer performance (see Table 4A). 
 
When comparing returns on the largest Canadian funds with those in the UK and the US, 
statistics in Table 4B show that the former frequently outperformed the latter. For example, 
the mean return between 1990 and 2006 for UK funds was 7.4% (BT), 7.5% (BoE), 7.7% 
(Strathclyde) and 7.3% (USS), and for the US the calculated outturns were 6.7% (CALPERS), 
7.6% (NY State), and 7.0% (NY City). When risk is taken into account, the Sharpe ratio still 
favours superior performance achieved by the Canadian funds, with US and UK funds having 
Sharpe ratios of 0.6-0.8.  
 
Table 4B: Comparing individual fund real returns with benchmarks, 1990-2006, in %  
Canada  
Actual 
Portfolio 50-50 
20% 
Foreign 
40% 
Foreign 
Global 
Portfolio 
Diversified 
Portfolio 
OMERS Mean 9.1 9.2 8.6 8.0 6.2 8.1 
 S. Dev 7.8 9.3 8.6 8.3 9.6 8.1 
 Ratio 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.0 
CPP Mean 8.9 9.2 8.6 8.0 6.2 8.1 
 S. Dev 7.7 9.3 8.6 8.3 9.6 8.1 
 Ratio 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.0 
OTPP Mean 9.2 9.2 8.6 8.0 6.2 8.1 
 S. Dev 7.1 9.3 8.6 8.3 9.6 8.1 
 Ratio 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.0 
        
UK        
BT Mean 7.4 7.5 7.0 6.5 5.2 6.9 
 S. Dev 10.8 9.0 9.0 9.3 11.6 9.4 
 Ratio 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.7 
BoE Mean 7.5 7.5 7.0 6.5 5.2 6.9 
 S. Dev 11.9 9.0 9.0 9.3 11.6 9.4 
 Ratio 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.7 
Strathclyde Mean 7.7 7.5 7.0 6.5 5.2 6.9 
 S. Dev 11.4 9.0 9.0 9.3 11.6 9.4 
 Ratio 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.7 
USS Mean 7.3 7.5 7.0 6.5 5.2 6.9 
 S. Dev 11.6 9.0 9.0 9.3 11.6 9.4 
 Ratio 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.7 
        
US        
CALPERS Mean 6.7 7.6 7.0 6.4 4.7 6.8 
 S. Dev 9.0 10.1 9.0 8.7 12.0 8.6 
 Ratio 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.8 
NY State Mean 7.6 7.6 7.0 6.4 4.7 6.8 
 S. Dev 9.7 10.1 9.0 8.7 12.0 8.6 
 Ratio 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.8 
NY City Mean 7.0 7.6 7.0 6.4 4.7 6.8 
 S. Dev 9.5 10.1 9.0 8.7 12.0 8.6 
 Ratio 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.8 
Source: authors‟ own calculations. S. Dev: standard deviation; Ratio: mean/standard deviation.   
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As for national data, the reason for different performance between funds might be due to the 
fact that the return on domestic assets during the period 1990 and 2006 was higher in Canada. 
For example Canadian equities returned 10.8%, while the corresponding returns for the UK 
were 8.7% and the US 10.1%, see Appendix 1. This difference is important given the large 
share of pension assets allocated to domestic equities in all selected pension funds. And this is 
shown when we compare the funds with realisable benchmarks in each country, which as 
argued above is a more appropriate comparison. 
 
Looking at the Canadian funds, as for the national data, the three funds often underperform 
the domestic bond and equity portfolio (as shown in the grey cells). This is less common for 
the UK funds, with BoE and Strathclyde outperforming all the benchmarks, as also does the 
NY State fund in the US. However, Canadian funds tend to benefit from higher Sharpe ratios 
than the benchmarks, which is not the case for the UK and US funds. 
 
Summarising, although the results are much more comparable than for the sectors as a whole 
and for longer periods, over 1990-2006 there is some evidence of underperformance of 3 large 
Canadian funds relative to the 50-50 domestic benchmark. This can be attributed to portfolio 
regulations, although it is also influenced by the quality of asset allocation decisions. 
 
 
Appendix 5: Funds in the wider sample (2000-2006 or shorter) 
 
Canada US UK 
Ontario Teachers California Public Employees BT Group 
Canada Pension California State Teachers Universities Superannuation 
Ontario Municipal Employees New York State Common British Coal Pension Schemes 
Hospitals of Ontario Florida State Board Royal Bank of Scotland Group 
Quebec Pension New York City Retirement Barclays Bank U.K. 
Public Service Pension Plan Texas Teachers Lloyds TSB Group 
B.C. Municipal Wisconsin Investment Board National Grid 
B.C. Public Service General Electric BAE Systems Pension Scheme 
Ontario Pension Board New Jersey HSBC Bank 
B.C. Teachers Ohio Public Employees Corus U.K. 
OPSEU Ohio State Teachers Strathclyde Pension Fund 
Canadian National Railways Washington State Board Greater Manchester Pension Fund 
Canada Post Michigan Retirement BBC 
Local Authorities Pension Board Oregon Public Employees ICI 
Hydro-Quebec Pennsylvania School Employees West Midlands Metropolitan 
 Virginia Retirement CGNU 
 Georgia Teachers GlaxoSmithKline 
  HBOS 
  Rolls-Royce 
  Marks & Spencer 
  Prudential Staff 
  Civil Aviation Authority 
Source: see Appendix 2.  
 
 
